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Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: 
An Empirical Analysis 
CHARLOTTE S. ALEXANDER* & ARTHI PRASAD** 
This Article presents an original analysis of newly available data from a 
landmark survey of 4387 low-wage, front-line workers in the three largest U.S. 
cities. We analyze data on worker claims, retaliation, and legal knowledge to 
investigate what we call “bottom-up” workplace law enforcement, or the reliance 
of many labor and employment statutes on workers themselves to enforce their 
rights. We conclude that bottom-up workplace law enforcement may fail to protect 
the workers who are most vulnerable to workplace rights violations, as they often 
lack the legal knowledge and incentives to complain that are prerequisites for 
enforcement activity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Workplace rights in the United States are generally enforced from the bottom 
up. With few exceptions, labor and employment laws contain private rights of 
action that enable workers themselves to bring lawsuits when their rights are 
violated.1 These private lawsuits vastly outnumber government enforcement actions 
against law-breaking employers.2 Even what seems to be top-down government 
enforcement is often bottom-up enforcement in disguise, as government agencies 
depend in large part on worker complaints to direct their enforcement activity.3 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act and, in large part, the National Labor 
Relations Act are significant exceptions, as workers themselves may not sue to enforce 
statutory health and safety protections or prohibitions on unfair labor practices. Michael J. 
Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 731–32 (2003) 
(discussing the lack of a private right of action under the OSHA and NLRA). 
 2. Between fiscal years 1997 and 2012, for example, the number of cases filed by 
private plaintiffs in federal court to enforce civil rights employment laws was forty-eight 
times the number of cases filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC). Compare EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm 
(listing 5705 EEOC enforcement suits filed in the federal district courts in fiscal years 1997 
through 2012), with Supplements Table C-2A: Cases Commenced by Nature of Suit, 
Judicial Business Archive, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness
/archive.aspx (listing annual reports identifying 274,422 “Civil Rights Employment” and 
“ADA—Employment” cases filed by private plaintiffs in federal district court in fiscal years 
1997 through 2012). Likewise, between fiscal years 2000 and 2011, private plaintiffs filed 
thirty-eight times more Federal Fair Labor Standards Act cases than did the U.S. Department 
of Labor. Author-compiled data, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) 
(finding 1382 cases with the FLSA Nature of Suit code filed in federal court by the U.S. 
Secretary of Labor versus 52,865 cases filed by private plaintiffs) (on file with authors). 
 3. For example, almost all lawsuits brought by the EEOC, which enforces federal 
antidiscrimination statutes, begin as worker-filed charges. Though the EEOC may 
affirmatively initiate an investigation using a mechanism known as a commissioner charge, 
this charge is rarely used, with only twelve charges filed in fiscal year 2012. Performance 
and Accountability Report: FY2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2012par_performance.cfm (“[I]n FY 2012, 12 new 
Commissioner charges were filed.”). The U.S. Department of Labor may also initiate its own 
affirmative “directed investigations,” but those are vastly outnumbered by complaint-driven 
investigations. DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC 
ENFORCEMENT 8 (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources
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Workplace law enforcement therefore depends significantly on worker “voice,” 
with workers themselves identifying violations of their rights and making claims to 
enforce them.4 
In theory, a bottom-up system should produce an accessible, responsive, and 
efficient workplace law enforcement regime. The parties with the most information 
about violations and the greatest incentive to correct them—the workers—drive the 
enforcement process.5 Workers need not wait on cumbersome, budget-strapped, or 
politically hamstrung government agencies, but can take enforcement duties into 
their own hands.6 And when government agencies do act, the bottom-up system 
should allow them to allocate resources efficiently: the “market” in complaints 
should signal to agencies which employers are bad actors in need of reform.7 
However elegantly designed, there is good reason to believe that the system fails 
in practice, and that it fails particularly badly in the case of workers who are most 
vulnerable to workplace rights violations.8 These workers include women, those 
                                                                                                                 
/strategicEnforcement.pdf (reporting that over 75% of U.S. Department of Labor Wage and 
Hour Division investigations in 2008 arose from worker complaints, as opposed to 
agency-initiated complaints in accordance with the Department’s strategic enforcement 
priorities); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement 
Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 556 (2010) (“The 
[U.S. Department of Labor] is thus expending most of its resources on inspectors responding 
to complaints filed by individual workers, without an underlying justification that this 
approach is likely to be effective in detecting violators.”). 
 4. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970) (defining a worker’s choices when faced 
with a problem within her organization as exit, voice, and loyalty: “Voice is here defined as 
any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of 
affairs . . . .”); see also Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) 
(“For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance with 
prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of 
payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees 
seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.”). But see HIRSCHMAN, supra at 21–
25 (discussing the option to “exit,” or take one’s labor or business elsewhere); id. at 76–105 
(discussing a “theory of loyalty”). 
 5. See Gideon Yaniv, Complaining About Noncompliance with the Minimum Wage 
Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 351, 351–52 (1994) (“Being the direct (and sole) victims of 
noncompliance, underpaid workers are naturally perceived as the faithful guardians of the 
minimum wage law.”). 
 6. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376–77 (2005) (“Private lawsuits can potentially help to fill the 
enforcement gap left by the undercommitment of public resources; indeed, they can 
sometimes supply a big gun where public enforcement has none to wield.”). 
 7. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and 
the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y. J. 59, 70 
(2005) (“Ideally, regulators would like to assume two things: (1) that the workers who are 
complaining are voicing legitimate grievances and representing them accurately (in other 
words, that employees working under lawful conditions are not complaining); and (2) that 
workers who are experiencing violations will complain.” (emphasis in original)). 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 73 (finding “only modest overlap between [worker] complaints and 
[employer] compliance” with the Fair Labor Standards and Occupational Safety and Health 
Acts). 
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with less education, nonunionized workers, and undocumented workers, all of 
whom hold relatively disempowered positions both in the workplace and in society 
as a whole.9 The system fails these workers because it is built on two foundational, 
misplaced assumptions: (1) that workers have the substantive and procedural legal 
knowledge to identify violations of their rights and access the proper enforcement 
procedures, and (2) that workers have sufficient incentives to file suit or make 
agency complaints.10 Using a rich source of newly available survey data, this 
Article demonstrates that for many low-wage, front-line workers—those who earn 
below the median wage for the city where they live and hold nonmanagerial, 
nonsupervisory, or nontechnical jobs—neither assumption applies. 
This Article analyzes data that were originally collected as part of the 2008 
Unregulated Work Survey, a landmark study of 4387 low-wage, front-line workers 
in the three largest U.S. cities (New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles).11 These data 
are valuable, as they include “hidden” groups such as undocumented people or day 
laborers who are often excluded from research due to their marginalized social, 
political, and economic statuses. The data are also important because they enable 
empirical analyses of the determinants of claiming behavior and the transformation 
of problems into legal claims, subjects of much study within the sociolegal, 
economic, and political science literatures.12 Finally, analyses such as these are 
important as a policy matter. As Steven Willborn puts it, as “policymakers sort 
through the many choices available when they are deciding how to enforce a labor 
statute,” they should be guided by both theory and data on the flaws and benefits of 
our current system of workplace law enforcement.13 
Our analysis reveals gaps in workers’ legal knowledge and powerful incentives 
to stay silent in the face of workplace problems. First, the data show that more than 
three-quarters of surveyed workers did not know where to file a government 
complaint about a problem on the job, and almost 60% of these workers 
misunderstood their minimum wage and overtime rights.14 The data also suggest 
that female and undocumented workers had less accurate procedural legal 
knowledge than their male and documented counterparts.15 Legal knowledge 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See generally infra Part III (reporting results pertaining to women, nonunionized, 
less educated, and undocumented workers). 
 10. Steven Willborn describes workers’ lack of legal knowledge and lack of incentives 
slightly differently, as problems with detection and discovery of labor regulation violations 
and problems with prosecution. Steven L. Willborn, Labor Enforcement Theory: The Case of 
Public vs. Private Enforcement, in REGULATING DECENT WORK (Colin Fenwick & John 
Howe eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 3). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. Willborn, supra note 10, at 1 (“The consequences of [the differences in types of] 
labor enforcement are under-studied empirically. Labor enforcement theory, if anything, is 
even less well-studied. This is unfortunate, in part, because only a well-developed theory can 
help policymakers sort through the many choices available when they are deciding how to 
enforce a labor statute. Moreover, a well-developed theory is necessary to guide researchers 
in their efforts to understand both general issues of labor enforcement and particular issues 
relating to specific legislation.”). 
 14. See infra Part III.D–E. 
 15. See infra Part III.D–E. 
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therefore appears to decrease with a worker’s relative power and stability, and 
many workers simply may not have the information necessary to become 
workplace law enforcers. 
Second, even informed workers may lack an incentive to exercise “voice” on the 
job. The data show that about 43% of workers who had experienced a workplace 
problem within the twelve months prior to the survey decided not to make a 
claim.16 The most common reason for workers’ silence was their fear of employer 
retaliation; the second was their belief that their claim would have no effect.17 Their 
fear of retaliation was well founded: about 43% of workers reported experiencing 
employer retaliation as a result of their most recent claim about a justiciable 
workplace problem in the twelve months before the survey.18 Likewise, workers’ 
lack of faith in the efficacy of claiming was borne out by the data, as only about 
15% of employers addressed the claim or promised to address it.19 
Though workplace laws offer a set of protections and inducements to entice 
workers to become law enforcers—what we call “operational rights”20—these 
incentives are miscalibrated in the case of many low-wage, front-line workers, 
whose fear of retaliation or doubt in the efficacy of complaining outweigh the 
benefits that would accrue from workplace law enforcement.21 
The data suggest, then, that low-wage, front-line workers such as the cashiers, 
parking lot attendants, and dishwashers captured by the Unregulated Work Survey 
may be particularly unsuited as bottom-up rights enforcers. At the same time, 
numerous studies have shown that workplace rights violations are extraordinarily 
prevalent in the very industries that employ these workers.22 Thus, the same 
low-wage, front-line workers who are the most likely to experience workplace 
rights violations may be the least likely to become rights enforcers. Workers are 
overdeterred from claiming, and employers may be underdeterred from complying, 
creating a self-perpetuating enforcement gap in labor and employment law.23 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. See infra Part III.C. 
 19. See infra Part III.C. 
 20. See infra Part IV.A; see also Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor: 
A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 386 (2012) (using the 
term “operational rights” to refer to the set of incentives and protections designed to 
operationalize or effectuate substantive rights, to entice workers to become bottom-up law 
enforcers). 
 21. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2010) (“Legislators, as well as adjudicators, must consider 
tailoring the incentives embedded in the law to the misconduct and the individual that it 
targets as an enforcer.”). 
 22. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 23. Estlund, supra note 6, at 330 (“Traditional enforcement mechanisms have often 
failed to raise the cost of noncompliance high enough to outweigh the immediate gains from 
noncompliance. Most enforcement actions secure only the back wages owed to employees 
(if that); that means opportunistic employers risk very little by underpaying employees and 
hoping—quite realistically—to avoid enforcement, either by inspection or complaint . . . . 
Simply ignoring the law is an especially tempting strategy for marginal producers at the 
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews previous work in the sociolegal, 
economic, and political science literatures that provides a theoretical framework for 
the present analysis. Part II describes the methodology of the 2008 Unregulated 
Work Survey, the data collected, and our own analysis. Part III reports our findings 
on the frequency of worker claims, the prevalence of retaliation against workers 
who did make claims, the level of workers’ substantive and procedural legal 
knowledge, and workers’ incentives to engage in enforcement activity. Part IV 
discusses the implications of a rights enforcement regime that leaves out the most 
vulnerable workers. Part V concludes by examining possible alternative structures 
for workplace law enforcement. 
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This Article fits into a tradition within the sociolegal, economic, and political 
science literatures of studying the determinants of claiming behavior and provides 
an opportunity to expand on existing models. The classic framework for 
understanding the transformation of problems into legal claims comes from 
William Felstiner and his coauthors.24 In this view, problems move through three 
phases: naming, blaming, and claiming.25 First, a person must “say[] to [her]self 
that a particular experience has been injurious.”26 This is naming. Second, she must 
“attribute[] [the] injury to the fault of another individual or social entity”—
blaming.27 Third, in the process of claiming, she voices her grievance “to the 
person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy.”28 
Richard Miller, Austin Sarat, and Marc Galanter, among others, propose a more 
complex dispute generation and resolution pyramid, with additional layers beyond 
claiming.29 The pyramid accounts for claims that are disputed by the opposing 
                                                                                                                 
bottom of the production chain, who have little fixed capital or stake in their reputation, who 
tend to operate under the regulatory radar, and who often rely heavily on undocumented 
immigrant workers who are too fearful or desperate to complain.” (footnotes omitted)); see 
also David Weil, “Broken Windows,” Vulnerable Workers, and the Future of Worker 
Representation, FORUM, Jan. 2012, at 1, 1 (“In the presence of persistent violations, keeping 
one’s head down, ‘staying out of other people’s business,’ and turning a blind eye to unfair 
treatment of others is a survival strategy.”). 
 24. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 
635–36 (1980–81). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 635. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 635–36. 
 29. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 4, 11 (1983); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and 
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 545 (1980–81); see 
also Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 681 
(“At the base of the dispute pyramid are perceived injurious experiences—the broad mass of 
injuries that people recognize. Some proportion of these perceived injurious experiences are 
grievances: injuries that involve a violation of right or entitlement. . . . Only some grievances 
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party and the resulting suit filing and disposition in court, and the pyramid’s shape 
reflects the fact that many “named” problems—the wide bottom layers—never 
progress all the way through to litigation at the pyramid’s peak.30 
In a separate strand of economics literature, Albert Hirschman’s seminal work 
examines problems that arise within organizations such as the workplace.31 
Hirschman posits that people have three options in such circumstances: exit, voice, 
and loyalty.32 Exit is the option to take one’s labor elsewhere; voice is a worker’s 
attempt “to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs”; 
and loyalty can result in a decision to remain within the organization and silently 
withstand recognized problems.33 In many ways, Hirschman’s “voice” can be 
thought of as Felstiner’s “claiming.” 
The present Article takes this prior work as the starting point for investigating 
the empirics of workplace dispute generation and resolution and for constructing a 
more complex model that incorporates workers’ legal knowledge and incentive 
structures. Figure 1 illustrates how such a model might look, presenting the 
panoply of options that workers face when identifying problems on the job and 
deciding whether and how to address them. The darkened arrows represent a direct 
path from problem identification to claim resolution using formal legal means such 
as a lawsuit or government agency complaint. This is the path that our current 
system of bottom-up workplace law enforcement envisions: workers have the legal 
knowledge to engage in “naming”; they then “blame” the appropriate party and are 
incentivized and knowledgeable enough to exercise “voice,” to make a “claim” in 
the form of a lawsuit or agency complaint and pursue it through resolution. 
However, as the complexity of the diagram illustrates, there are many alternative 
paths. And as the diminishing size of each pyramid layer indicates, many problems 
“escape” along the way. Workers may not have the substantive legal knowledge to 
recognize justiciable problems (violations of their legal rights at work) as such.34 
Workers who “name” the problems they face may nevertheless choose exit or 
loyalty over voice, or may not know who to “blame,” as a legal matter, for the 
issues they face. Workers who do make claims may be faced with inaction or 
                                                                                                                 
become claims: when an individual contacts the party allegedly responsible for the 
grievance. Fewer still are disputes: when the party allegedly responsible for an individual’s 
claim initially denies their responsibility. Some number of disputes results in filings: a 
formal complaint (in a litigation model, a court filing). The smallest category of all is made 
up of trials: cases that are adjudicated.” (emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted)). 
 30. Galanter, supra note 29, at 11–26 (describing the pyramid). 
 31. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4. 
 32. Id. at 21–35 (discussing exit); id. at 30 (discussing voice); id. at 76–105 (discussing 
loyalty). 
 33. See id. at 21–25 (discussing exit), id. at 30 (discussing voice); id. at 76–105 
(discussing loyalty, which, in the alternative, might result in a decision to stay within the 
organization and exercise voice). 
 34. Justiciable problems are those that “raise issues in civil law, have civil legal aspects, 
and have consequences shaped by civil law.” Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of 
Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
949, 968 (2009) (footnote omitted). See generally HAZEL GENN WITH SARAH BEINART, 
STEVEN FINCH, CHRISTOS KOROVESSIS & PATTEN SMITH, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE 
DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW (1999) (setting out theory of justiciable problems, 
unmet legal needs, and access to justice). 
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retaliation by their employers, at which point they may choose exit or loyalty, or 
may start again at the bottom of the pyramid and progress through the steps of 
“naming,” “blaming,” and choosing whether or not to make a retaliation “claim.” 
Moreover, if a claim is escalated and becomes a lawsuit or agency complaint, the 
worker’s incentive structure must push her to pursue the claim to resolution in 
whatever form it takes (e.g., win or loss at trial, case dismissal, settlement). The 
costs of formal legal action in time and treasure may build over the duration of the 
process, and the worker may be retaliated against at any point, which then triggers 
its own decision tree. Throughout the process, the worker’s incentive structure must 
continue to encourage pursuit of her claim; for her to persevere through the claim’s 
resolution, the benefits of claiming must consistently outweigh its costs. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Workplace dispute pyramid. 
 
Thus, this more complex workplace dispute generation and resolution pyramid 
synthesizes Hirschman’s theories with those of Felstiner and his progeny. It also 
adds to the model the concepts of substantive and procedural legal knowledge and 
incentives as prerequisites for problem identification, the transformation of 
problems into claims, and then those claims’ resolution. 
The very complexity of the model suggests that the simplistic assumptions 
behind our bottom-up workplace law enforcement regime (indicated by the 
darkened arrows in Figure 1) may be misplaced. Workers do not simply progress 
through a process of naming, blaming, claiming, and claim resolution; they must at 
every step choose among alternatives and have the legal knowledge and appropriate 
incentive structure to encourage progression. 
The pyramid also raises many empirical questions. Which workers have the 
substantive legal knowledge to recognize certain workplace problems as justiciable 
rights violations? Which workers have the procedural legal knowledge required to 
transform their claims into lawsuits or agency complaints? Which workers choose 
exit or silent loyalty over voice, at which stage in the process, and why? What 
forms of extralegal dispute resolution might workers be accessing as alternatives to 
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court, and how do those mechanisms work? How are workers’ incentive 
structures—their assessments of claiming’s costs and benefits—functioning to 
encourage or discourage claiming? How do those incentives shift and change over 
the course of the process, and do they work differently for claims of different type 
and magnitude? Finally, as a policy matter, how do we want these incentive 
structures to function, and what are the implications for our bottom-up workplace 
law enforcement regime? 
The data presented in this Article provide an opportunity to examine some of 
these questions, focusing on low-wage, front-line workers as potential workplace 
rights enforcers. In particular, this Article investigates which of these workers make 
claims on the job, the prevalence of retaliation against workers who do engage in 
claiming behavior, the level of workers’ substantive and procedural legal 
knowledge, and workers’ incentives to engage in claiming activity. However, these 
data also leave many questions unanswered, paving the way for additional future 
research. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. 2008 Unregulated Work Survey 
The data analyzed in this Article were originally collected as part of the 2008 
Unregulated Work Survey, a large-scale study of 4387 low-wage, front-line 
workers in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. With foundation funding, the 
study was conducted by researchers from the National Employment Law Project, 
the University of Illinois at Chicago’s Center for Urban Economic Development, 
and the UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, in partnership 
with researchers at Cornell University, the City University of New York, Rutgers 
University, and the UCLA Downtown Labor Center. The survey team originally 
published some of its findings in a 2009 report, Broken Laws, Unprotected 
Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities,35 and 
released its full data set to outside researchers, including the present authors, for the 
first time in January 2012. 
The survey targeted workers in each city who were at least eighteen years old 
and who worked in industries where the median wage was less than 85% of the city 
median wage.36 Workers also had to hold “front-line,” or nonmanagerial, 
nonsupervisory, and nontechnical jobs.37 Workers surveyed included cooks and 
dishwashers, car-wash workers, groundskeepers, maids and housekeepers, parking 
lot attendants, cashiers, cafeteria workers, tellers, garment workers, teacher’s 
assistants, and security guards.38 Their median hourly wage was $8.02. Each 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. ANNETTE BERNHARDT, RUTH MILKMAN, NIK THEODORE, DOUGLAS HECKATHORN, 
MIRABAI AUER, JAMES DEFILIPPIS, ANA LUZ GONZÁLEZ, VICTOR NARRO, JASON 
PERELSHTEYN, DIANA POLSON & MICHAEL SPILLER, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED 
WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009), 
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1. 
 36. Id. at 56. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 16. 
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worker participated in a face-to-face interview in his or her native language, 
including English, Spanish, Polish, Russian, Chinese, French, Urdu, Hindi, and 
Korean.39 
Many of these workers would not be reached via traditional survey methods, as 
they might not appear on voter registration rolls or other official lists from which 
survey respondents are typically drawn or, due to their immigration status, might be 
unwilling to give personal information to a stranger survey-taker. Thus, a typically 
drawn random sample could exclude or undersample these workers, making it 
extremely difficult to infer anything about their characteristics or presence in the 
general population. As a result, the survey team employed a sampling methodology 
known as respondent-driven sampling (RDS).40 First pioneered in public health 
research, RDS uses survey respondents’ own social networks to allow researchers 
to gain access to “hidden” or hard-to-reach groups.41 RDS methodology solves the 
problems of lack of access and mistrust by relying on each early respondent to 
recruit additional later respondents. In an RDS survey, each initial “seed” receives a 
limited number of coded coupons to distribute to other people in her social 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Id. at 13–14. 
 40. For more on RDS methodology, see Douglas D. Heckathorn, Extensions of 
Respondent-Driven Sampling: Analyzing Continuous Variables and Controlling for 
Differential Recruitment, 37 SOC. METHODOLOGY 151 (2007); Douglas D. Heckathorn, 
Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations, 44 SOC. 
PROBS. 174 (1997) [hereinafter New Approach]; Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven 
Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population Estimates from Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden 
Populations, 49 SOC. PROBS. 11 (2002) [hereinafter Chain-Referral]; Matthew J. Salganik & 
Douglas D. Heckathorn, Sampling and Estimation in Hidden Populations Using Respondent-
Driven Sampling, 34 SOC. METHODOLOGY 193 (2004); Matthew J. Salganik, Variance 
Estimation, Design Effects, and Sample Size Calculations for Respondent-Driven Sampling, 
83 J. URB. HEALTH 98 (2006); Erik Volz & Douglas D. Heckathorn, Probability Based 
Estimation Theory for Respondent Driven Sampling, 24 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 79 (2008). The 
above sources were all cited with approval in Michael W. Spiller, Annette Bernhardt, Jason 
Perelshteyn & Douglas Heckathorn, Technical Report: Sampling, Fielding, and Estimation 
in the 2008 Unregulated Work Survey (Ctr. for the Study of Econ. & Soc’y Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 62, 2010), available at http://www.economyandsociety.org/wp
-content/uploads/2013/08/wp62_SpillerHeckathornetal_Sampling.pdf. 
 41. More specifically, some populations may be too socially stigmatized to self-identify 
as members of the relevant group, some may live in socially insular communities that are not 
readily accessible to researchers, and some may be members of groups that are simply too 
small to be captured in a typical randomly drawn sample from the U.S. population as a 
whole. See, e.g., Douglas D. Heckathorn & Joan Jeffri, Finding the Beat: Using Respondent-
Driven Sampling to Study Jazz Musicians, 28 POETICS 307, 308 (2001) (defining jazz 
musicians as a “hidden population” in that “(1) no sampling frame exists, so the size and 
boundaries of the population are unknown, (2) there are strong privacy concerns, not because 
of illegal or stigmatized behavior, but because of the tight but informal networks which 
outsiders find hard to penetrate, and (3) the population constitutes a small proportion of the 
general population”); Heckathorn, New Approach, supra note 40, at 174 (“‘Hidden 
populations’ have two characteristics: first, no sampling frame exists, so the size and 
boundaries of the population are unknown; and second, there exist strong privacy concerns, 
because membership involves stigmatized or illegal behavior, leading individuals to refuse to 
cooperate, or give unreliable answers to protect their privacy.”). 
2014] BOTTOM-UP WORKPLACE LAW ENFORCEMENT 1079 
 
network.42 “Seeds” are compensated for their participation in the survey, as well as 
for each additional respondent they successfully recruit. They vouch for the 
integrity of the survey process, solving the trust problem, and they provide 
researchers with an entrée to hidden communities of respondents, solving the 
access problem. 
Though RDS allows researchers to reach respondents who would likely be 
missed by traditional survey methods, it creates problems of its own by generating 
a nonrandom sample of the population. Each respondent’s participation is not 
determined by chance, but instead by whether she is connected socially to a “seed.” 
Because randomness is the foundational assumption upon which all of statistical 
inference is built, RDS must compensate for the nonrandom nature of the samples 
that its network-recruitment method generates. RDS does so by weighting each 
response by the size and homophily, or sameness, of that respondent’s social 
network.43 (Researchers determine size and homophily by asking a series of 
carefully designed questions of each respondent.)44 Weighting produces an estimate 
of the prevalence of the particular variable of interest in the general population, 
known as the “population estimate,” within an RDS-specified confidence interval.45 
In other words, it allows the characteristics and experiences of the respondents who 
were surveyed to be generalized, roughly, to the three cities’ entire population of 
low-wage, front-line workers—here, approximately 1.64 million total workers.46 
Though RDS-like “snowball” or chain-referral survey methodologies have 
existed for years, this weighting procedure represents an innovation, allowing 
researchers to reliably account for the nonrandomness of respondents’ inclusion in 
the sample. RDS methods remain an active area of research in statistics and survey 
design, but the methodology is generally accepted as valid and is in wide use, 
particularly within the fields of sociology and public health.47 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Spiller et al., supra note 40, at 4 (“Our RDS survey began with an initial set of 
population members to be surveyed, which we located through our contacts in each city. 
These ‘seeds’ were then given a fixed number of uniquely numbered dollar-bill sized 
coupons to pass on to other eligible population members.”). 
 43. See Chain-Referral, supra note 40, at 13, 20 (discussing the nonrandom nature of 
RDS referrals and the resulting introduction of “homophily bias” and overrepresentation of 
respondents with larger social networks). 
 44. A list of survey questions regarding respondents’ social networks appears in 
Appendix A. Researchers also map respondents’ social networks by tracking coupon codes 
and charting the links between seeds and recruited respondents. Researchers are then able to 
gauge the level of homophily of each social network along a variety of axes to determine 
whether, for example, female seeds recruited exclusively female respondents and Latino/a or 
Hispanic seeds recruited exclusively Latino/a or Hispanic respondents.  
 45. See Chain-Referral, supra note 40, at 14 (discussing computation of population 
estimates and standard errors). 
 46. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2. 
 47. See, e.g., Matthew J. Salganik, Respondent-Driven Sampling in the Real World, 23 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 148 (2012) (discussing widespread use of RDS and ongoing refinements of 
RDS analytical techniques). 
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B. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the number and percentage of survey respondents by a variety of 
demographic and job characteristic variables. The term “high road,” which appears 
in Table 1 and throughout this Article, is used by labor economists to designate 
employers that provide some fringe benefits and pay their employees more than the 
required minimum: 
It is commonly posited that employers face the choice of either 
competing on the basis of cost or competing on the basis of quality, 
variety, and service. In popular discussion, the former is referred to as 
the “low road” and the latter as the “high road,” on the assumption that 
the latter implies more generous employment conditions (such as 
wages) and new work systems.48 
The original survey team designated a “high-road” employer as one that provided 
two or more of the following: health insurance, paid vacation days, paid sick days, 
and pay raises to employees. In this data set, the “high-road” designation was not 
particularly correlated with employer size. Employers with fewer than one hundred 
employees were roughly as likely as employers with more than one hundred 
employees to offer “high-road” benefits. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Frequency (Percent) 
 
 
City 
 
Chicago 1097 (26%) 
Los Angeles 1772 (42%) 
New York 1391 (33%) 
  
Gender  
Female 2250 (53%) 
Male 2009 (47%) 
  
Race/Ethnicity  
Latino/a or Hispanic 2506 (59%) 
Black or African American   919 (22%) 
Asian or other race   614 (14%) 
White   214  (5%) 
  
 
Age  
46+ years 1258 (30%) 
36–45 years 1071 (26%) 
26–35 years 1036 (25%) 
18–25 years   785 (19%) 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Paul Osterman, How Common Is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts It?, 47 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 173, 179 (1994) (citations omitted); see generally ARNE L. 
KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT 
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S TO 2000S (2013) (describing the rise of precarious 
labor and the growing gap in job quality between high-wage and low-wage work). 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Frequency (Percent) 
 
  
Education  
Less than high school degree, no GED 1715 (40%) 
High school degree or GED 1385 (33%) 
Some college or associate’s degree   819 (19%) 
College or higher degree   326   (8%) 
  
Nativity and immigration status  
U.S.-born citizen 1506 (36%) 
Undocumented resident 1445 (34%) 
Foreign-born citizen   518 (12%) 
Documented resident   757 (18%) 
  
Union membership  
Not a union member 3911 (92%)  
Union member   330   (8%) 
  
Occupation during previous workweek49  
Service occupations 2156 (51%) 
Production, transportation, and material   944 (22%) 
Sales and office occupations   760 (18%) 
Construction, extraction, and maintenance   333   (8%) 
Management, professional, and related     66   (2%) 
  
Industry during previous workweek50  
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodations, and food 
services 
 
833 (20%) 
Other services (except public administration) 746 (18%) 
Retail trade 662 (16%) 
Nondurable goods manufacturing 605 (14%) 
Educational, health, and social services 431 (10%) 
Professional, scientific, and management 411 (10%) 
Construction 267   (6%) 
Transportation and warehousing 201   (5%) 
Finance, insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing 58   (1%) 
Durable goods manufacturing 32   (1%) 
Wholesale trade 6   (0%) 
Public administration 4   (0%) 
Information and communications 3   (0%) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. Occupation categories are those used by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DOL, 2010 CENSUS OCCUPATIONAL 
CLASSIFICATION (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cenocc.pdf. 
 50. Industry categories are those used by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DOL, 2007 CENSUS INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cenind.pdf. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
  
 
Variable 
 
 
Frequency (Percent) 
 
  
Job tenure  
0–5 years 3675 (87%) 
6–10 years 372   (9%) 
11–15 years 130   (3%) 
16–20 years 29   (1%) 
  
Employer size  
Under 100 employees 2371 (62%) 
100 employees or more 1484 (38%) 
  
“High-road” employer  
0–1 “high-road” indicators 2967 (69%) 
2+ “high-road” indicators 1233 (31%) 
 
(N = 4387) 
  
C. Our Analysis 
The original survey team’s 2009 Broken Laws report focused primarily on 
unpaid wages and health and safety violations experienced by low-wage, front-line 
workers.51 Though the report also presented figures on the prevalence of retaliation 
and workers who chose not to make claims about workplace problems (variables of 
interest here), it did so only descriptively, without the regressions included in our 
analysis that allow study of the characteristics of workers who made different 
claiming choices.52 Nor did the report investigate our other variables of interest: the 
level of workers’ substantive and procedural legal knowledge and the factors 
associated with workers’ being more or less informed about their rights. 
Drawing on the raw survey data, our analysis focuses on five main variables: (1) 
workplace problems, or the frequency with which workers reported experiencing 
problems on the job (the “naming” of problems); (2) claims, or the frequency with 
which workers engaged in claiming behavior after identifying a workplace 
problem; (3) retaliation, or the prevalence of retaliation against workers who made 
claims about justiciable problems; (4) substantive legal knowledge, or the extent to 
which workers knew their minimum wage and overtime rights;53 and (5) procedural 
legal knowledge, or the extent to which workers knew how to make a government 
complaint about a workplace problem.54 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2 (“This report exposes a world of work in 
which the core protections that many Americans take for granted—the right to be paid at 
least the minimum wage, the right to be paid for overtime hours, the right to take meal 
breaks, access to workers’ compensation when injured, and the right to advocate for better 
working conditions—are failing significant numbers of workers.”). 
 52. Id. at 24–25. 
 53. The original survey asked only about workers’ knowledge of minimum wage and 
overtime law and not about their knowledge of other types of workplace rights. Relevant 
survey questions are reproduced in Appendix A. 
 54. The original survey asked only whether workers knew where to file a government 
complaint and not how to engage in other methods of formal claiming such as contacting an 
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Using the RDS network-size weighting process, we first generated population 
point estimates and confidence intervals for the five main variables.55 This allowed 
us to calculate the percentage (within a given margin of error) of the three cities’ 
low-wage, front-line workforce that fell into each of the five main variable 
categories, that is, the approximate percentage of workers who had identified 
workplace problems, made claims, experienced retaliation, and had accurate 
substantive and procedural legal knowledge. We also generated RDS estimates for 
two additional variables: (1) the reasons workers gave for their decisions not to 
make claims; and (2) for those who did make claims, the method(s) and subject(s) 
of those claims.56 
Next, we explored which groups of workers were more or less likely to identify 
problems, make claims, experience retaliation, and have accurate substantive and 
procedural legal knowledge. Using logistic regression, we modeled the associations 
between these dependent variables and a number of independent variables, 
including worker demographics and job characteristics.57 Though logistic 
regression does not allow us to identify causal relationships, it does enable us to 
identify whether workers with certain characteristics—for example, women or 
undocumented workers—were more or less likely, holding all else constant, to 
                                                                                                                 
attorney, union representative, or other third party. Relevant survey questions are reproduced 
in Appendix A. 
 55. We used the Respondent Driven Sampling Analysis Tool software (RDSAT), 
available at http://www.respondentdrivensampling.org, to produce RDS population point 
estimates and confidence intervals. 
 56. We report these results in Part III and Table 7 in Appendix B. 
 57. We used Stata to run all regressions. We chose to use a logit model because our 
dependent variables are binary, that is, they have two values (0, 1). To test model fit, we 
used a nonlinear version of the Hausman test (a combination of the suest and testn1 
commands in Stata) to compare the logit and ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients. The 
null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients from both estimators are not significantly 
different from each other so the OLS estimator is consistent and efficient, versus an 
alternative hypothesis that the coefficients from both estimators are significantly different 
from each other so the OLS estimator would be inconsistent. The test results for our 
regressions led us to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that logit is the better model. In 
addition, we used probability weights provided by the original survey team in estimating the 
logistic regression equations to correct for the sample bias introduced by the RDS sampling 
methodology. These weights also took into account the undersampling of certain 
races/ethnicities among survey respondents. For a further explanation of the weighting 
process, see Spiller et al., supra note 40, at 13. Finally, following the protocol recommended 
by the original survey team, we dropped from our analysis all respondents identified as home 
health workers, due to changing coverage of this occupational category under federal and 
state wage and hour law. For other uses and explanations of logistic regression methods and 
interpretation, see James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility 
Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1694–1713 (1999) (using logistic regression to model the effect of a 
variety of independent variables on judicial voting in cases involving unions); Cass R. 
Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of 
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 316 (2004) (using logistic 
regression to investigate the relationship between a judge’s ideology and voting patterns).  
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identify problems, make claims, experience retaliation, or have accurate substantive 
and procedural legal knowledge.58 
A preliminary note is warranted on possible limitations of the survey data. First, 
the survey was not designed primarily to investigate questions of problem 
identification, claiming behavior, retaliation, and legal knowledge. Though the 
particular survey questions analyzed in this Article do address those topics, they 
contain some gaps. For example, the questions concerning workers’ substantive 
legal knowledge asked only about knowledge of minimum wage and overtime 
rights, and not about other areas of employment and labor law, and the questions 
concerning procedural legal knowledge inquired only about claims made to a 
government agency, and not about claims made via litigation. As a result, the 
conclusions drawn in this Article are necessarily limited. 
Second, the data are now relatively old, as they were collected in 2008, five 
years before the time of this writing. However, 2008 came after the onset of the 
Great Recession, the effects of which low-wage, front-line workers continue to 
feel.59 To the extent that depressed economic conditions have an impact on 
workers’ claiming behavior, conditions are still relatively depressed, and 
readministering the survey today would likely produce substantially similar 
results.60 In fact, some commentators have observed that conditions for low-wage, 
front-line workers have worsened since 2008, as employers increasingly use 
temporary, part-time, and other contingent work arrangements, and union density 
continues to decline.61 
Third, one could argue that selection effects may be present among the 
respondents who chose to participate in the survey. Only the more assertive 
workers would choose to be surveyed, the argument goes, and those more assertive 
workers might also be more likely to have made claims on the job. However, as 
noted in Part III, only about 57% of workers made any claim at all in the twelve 
months before the survey. If this figure represents only assertive, claim-prone 
workers, then the real incidence of claiming behavior was even lower, further 
emphasizing the problems with a claims-driven, bottom-up workplace law 
enforcement regime. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Part III and Tables 8–12 in Appendix C present the results of our logistic regression 
models. 
 59. See, e.g., Long-Term Unemployment: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions: 
Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 35, 36 (2010) (statement of Lawrence 
F. Katz, Professor, Harvard University) (testifying about lingering “labor market distress” 
well into 2010). 
 60. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 8 (postulating that “[e]conomic downturns may . . . 
affect discovery of violations through private enforcement”). 
 61. PAMELA LOPREST & AUSTIN NICHOLS, UNEMPLOYMENT & RECOVERY PROJECT, 
URBAN INST., LESS-EDUCATED CONTINUE TO LOSE JOBS IN RECOVERY—EVEN IN LOW-WAGE 
INDUSTRIES (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?id=412382&RSSFeed
=UI_PovertyandSafetyNet.xml (“[S]ince the end of the recession, low-skill workers continue 
to be the biggest net job losers across industries.”); WEIL, supra note 3, at 9–11 (discussing 
the breakup, or “fissuring,” of the traditional employment relationship, declining 
unionization rates, and other factors contributing to the degradation of conditions for low-
wage, front-line workers). 
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III. RESULTS 
This Part, along with the tables in Appendices B and C,62 reports the results of 
our analysis of the survey data. The subsequent Part discusses possible 
explanations for our findings and considers the implications for bottom-up 
workplace law enforcement. 
A. Workplace Problems 
About one-third of low-wage, front-line workers identified a problem on the job 
in the twelve months before the survey.63 In Felstiner’s terms, these are the workers 
who perceived, or “named” problems. However, the occurrence of actual 
workplace problems was probably much higher. The original survey team gathered 
respondents’ raw wage and hour data and determined that 26% of workers had been 
paid less than the minimum wage during the previous workweek and 76% who had 
worked more than forty hours had not been paid proper overtime.64 Thirty percent 
of tipped workers had not been paid lawfully, and 70% of workers who had worked 
beyond their scheduled shift were not paid for this extra working time.65 These 
calculations focus only on violations of wage and hour laws; occurrences of actual 
workplace problems may have been higher if other rights violations were also 
considered.66 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Table 7 in Appendix B reports the RDS population point estimates and confidence 
intervals for the five main variables (workplace problems, claims, retaliation, substantive 
legal knowledge, and procedural legal knowledge), along with the reasons workers gave for 
their decisions not to make claims, and, for those who did engage in claims making, the 
method(s) and subject(s) of their claims. Tables 8–12 in Appendix C show the full results of 
our logistic regression equations for the workplace problems, claims, retaliation, and 
substantive and procedural legal knowledge variables. 
 63. The original survey did not ask respondents directly about workplace problem 
identification. As a result, we calculated the rate of problem identification by adding together 
the workers who had made a claim about a problem with the workers who had identified a 
problem but did not make a claim. See infra Appendix A (reproducing two separate survey 
questions). 
 64. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2–3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. For example, surveys of almost five hundred low-wage workers in the San 
Francisco, California, area conducted by sociologist Shannon Gleeson revealed that: 
Almost all claimants had had a rest or meal break denied or shortened 
throughout their working life, and half reported problems with timely payment. 
Over a third had been denied time off for illness and half had been become 
injured or ill because of their job. Verbal abuse or degrading treatment had at 
some point been present for two-thirds of the sample, and over a quarter of all 
women reported being sexually harassed at some point. 
Shannon Gleeson, The Limits to Lawyering: Findings from a Survey of Low-Wage Workers 
in the San Francisco Bay Area, Remarks at the Labor and Global Solidarity, American 
Sociological Association Labor & Labor Movements Section Mini-Conference (Aug. 12, 
2013) (on file with author). 
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The difference between the one-third of workers who identified workplace 
problems and the higher rates of actual problems points to issues with “naming”: 
workers were not “saying to [themselves] that a particular experience has been 
injurious.”67 As explored further below, the discrepancy may also be explained by 
workers’ lack of substantive legal knowledge, creating an inability to identify 
justiciable problems and an underreporting of problems at work.68 
Table 2 lists the characteristics of the workers who were more and less likely to 
identify workplace problems, all else equal. This and subsequent tables in this Part 
list only the regression results that are statistically significant and that likely can be 
explained by an actual association between the independent variables (worker 
characteristics) and dependent variable (workplace problems) rather than by 
chance. These results are indicated by asterisks. The table also lists results that are 
just outside the bounds of significance, but appear to be intuitively correct, 
indicated by a dagger. Full regression results for workplace problems are reported 
in Table 8 in Appendix C.69 
The regression results summarized throughout this Part should be interpreted 
differently depending on the type of independent variable at issue. For independent 
variables such as gender that have a discrete set of values (female and male), each 
value that was included in the regression model is compared to its counterpart that 
was not in the regression. These comparison values are known as the “base 
category,” and are listed for each regression in Tables 8–12 in Appendix C. For 
example, in Table 2, the variable “female” is included in the model, while “male” is 
in the base category. Table 2 shows that, holding all else constant, women workers 
were less likely to have identified a workplace problem in the previous year than 
male workers, the value in the base category. For continuous independent variables 
such as age, the results reflect the impact on the dependent variable when the value 
of the independent variable increases by one. Referring again to Table 2, for 
example, each additional year of age reported made a respondent less likely to 
identify a workplace problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Felstiner et al., supra note 24, at 635. 
 68. The discrepancy might also be explained by respondents’ reluctance to identify 
workplace problems to survey takers, out of a fear that their complaints might somehow 
reach their employers’ ears. 
 69. Throughout this Part, we have chosen only to examine the sign, or direction, of the 
association between independent and dependent variables, rather than the relative strength of 
that association. Though additional work could be done (using odds ratios or marginal 
effects) to rank the relative impact of each independent variable on the dependent variables, 
because many of our results lack statistical significance, we have chosen to restrict our 
analysis to an examination of only the sign or direction of the coefficient and not its relative 
magnitude. 
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Table 2. Workplace Problems 
 
 
Less likely to identify workplace problem 
 
More likely to identify workplace problem 
 
 
• Female** 
• Age*** 
• Not a union member† 
• Job tenure of fewer than 12 months* 
• Employer has fewer than 100 
employees** 
• Education*** 
• Does not know where to file 
government complaint (procedural 
legal knowledge)** 
• Employer is not “high road”*** 
(N = 3620) 
  
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15 
 
As Table 2 shows, women, nonunion members, workers who had job tenure of 
less than one year, and workers at employers with fewer than 100 employees were 
all less likely than their counterparts in the base category to have identified a 
problem at work in the previous twelve months. In addition, for every year of age a 
respondent reported, she was less likely to have identified a workplace problem. 
The results with respect to gender, union membership, and increasing age appear 
generally to follow from theory. Women, nonunion members, and older workers, 
who tend to hold less powerful positions in the workplace and society as a whole, 
may be less accustomed to taking the relatively transgressive step of “naming” 
workplace problems, to “saying to [themselves] that a particular experience has 
been injurious.”70 These groups of workers may also have less legal knowledge 
than other worker groups to enable them to identify problems at work. For 
example, Table 5, infra, reports that each increasing year of a respondent’s age was 
associated with a lower chance that a worker knew her minimum wage and 
overtime rights. In addition, labor unions may serve an educational or 
consciousness-raising function, enabling their members to engage in more 
“naming” of workplace problems than their nonunion counterparts.71 Social science 
research has also shown that women in particular may be reluctant to “name” 
workplace problems as such, “to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination 
[including sexual harassment], notwithstanding evidence” that these workplace 
problems have occurred.72 Researchers posit that this may be a self-esteem 
preservation strategy: if women workers’ failings are the result of personal 
deficiencies, rather than their gender, their self-esteem may suffer in the 
“performance domain,” but may be intact with respect to their standing in society 
as a whole.73 Such a dynamic may be at play in the results reported in Table 2, 
where women workers were less likely than men to “name” workplace problems.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Felstiner et al., supra note 24, at 635. 
 71. The results reported in Table 5, infra, complicate this narrative somewhat. 
 72. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 26 (2005) (collecting social 
science research). 
 73. Id. at 26–27. 
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With respect to job tenure, this result may merely be a consequence of exposure: 
workers who had been employed for less than a full year may have had fewer 
opportunities to experience, and to identify, a problem on the job during that year. 
Alternatively, workers with shorter job tenures may have had less experience in the 
workplace generally and be less aware of and able to identify workplace problems 
when they occurred. 
Finally, the positive association between a lower likelihood of naming 
workplace problems and a worker’s employment at a relatively small employer 
(fewer than 100 employees) could be interpreted in multiple ways. On the one 
hand, there may be fewer workplace problems to identify in the first place at 
smaller employers, because those workforces may be closer-knit and better at 
avoiding workplace conflict than larger ones.74 On the other hand, the rate of 
underlying workplace problems may be the same at smaller and larger employers, 
but workers at smaller employers may be less likely to identify those problems 
because of a greater sense of loyalty generated by small workplace size, or because 
smaller “mom and pop” employers may tend to hire workers who are a priori less 
educated and assertive than workers employed at larger, more sophisticated 
operations.75 
Table 2 also shows that every year of education reported by a worker made it 
more likely that she had identified a workplace problem in the previous twelve 
months. Workers who did not know where to file a government complaint and 
those employed by “low-road” employers were also more likely to have identified 
problems on the job. The education result makes sense: as education levels 
increase, one would expect workers to be aware of their legal rights and norms of 
fair treatment on the job, and to “name” violations of those rights and norms as 
they occur. The result with respect to workers employed by low-road employers is 
also intuitive: employers that do not provide health insurance, paid sick and 
vacation leave, and pay raises may generate more dissatisfaction in the workplace, 
and their workers may be more likely to identify workplace problems.  
The result with respect to lack of procedural legal knowledge is harder to 
explain, as one might expect that workers who did not know where to file a 
government complaint would be less likely to have identified a workplace problem 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See, e.g., Harry Matlay, Employee Relations in Small Firms: A Micro-Business 
Perspective, 21 EMP. REL. 285, 292 (1999) (describing the results of a study of 
approximately 6000 small businesses in the United Kingdom; finding that “[t]he deliberate 
informality inherent in the majority of [small business] owner/managers’ styles seems to 
have facilitated a personal approach that, in most cases, resulted in amicable solutions to 
complex and occasionally acrimonious work-related situations”). 
 75. See, e.g., Marilyn Carroll, Mick Marchington, Jill Earnshaw & Stephen Taylor, 
Recruitment in Small Firms: Processes, Methods and Problems, 21 EMP. REL. 236, 238 
(1999) (describing results of a study of forty small firms in the United Kingdom; reporting 
complaints from small firms about “the quality of labour available, including a lack of basic 
literacy skills, particularly among young people”); George Saridakis, Rebeca Muñoz Torres 
& Stewart Johnstone., Do Human Resource Practices Enhance Organizational Commitment 
in SMEs with Low Employee Satisfaction?, 24 BRIT. J. MGMT. 445, 452 (2013) (finding in 
analysis of nationwide survey of British firms that “employees in small organizations are 
more committed [to their organizations] than their counterparts in large firms”). 
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in the previous twelve months. However, this result may in fact signal the 
importance of a worker’s having both substantive and procedural legal knowledge 
in order to progress up the dispute identification and resolution pyramid. Without 
knowledge of her substantive legal rights in the workplace, procedural legal 
knowledge alone—knowing where or how to file a workplace complaint with the 
government—may not help a worker take the initial step of “saying to [herself] that 
a particular experience has been injurious.”76 
B. Claims 
Of the workers who had identified a workplace problem within the year prior to 
the survey, about 57% decided to make a claim of some type.77 Almost all of these 
workers (96%) chose to make a claim to their employer, while very few 
complained directly to a government agency or to an intermediary such as an 
attorney or union representative. Sixty-five percent of workers’ claims were about 
justiciable workplace problems, that is, violations of workers’ legal rights around 
pay, discrimination, harassment, abuse, or occupational safety. The remaining 
claims were nonjusticiable, centering on quality of worklife (e.g. commute time, 
workload, and work schedule) and benefits. Of all workers who had identified a 
workplace problem, then, approximately 37% made a claim about a justiciable 
problem, 20% made a nonjusticiable claim, and 43% made no claim at all. 
Of the 43% of workers who decided not to make a claim about an identified 
workplace problem, the top two reasons workers gave for their decision were a fear 
of being fired and a belief that the claim would make no difference.78 The next two 
reasons (apart from “other”) were also retaliation related: the worker’s fear of 
having her wages or hours cut and the worker’s knowledge of retaliation against 
others for claiming behavior. The next reason points to a lack of procedural legal 
knowledge: uncertainty as to how to make a claim. 
Table 3 lists the worker characteristics that were associated with a greater or 
lesser likelihood of claims making.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. Felstiner et al., supra note 24, at 635. 
 77. Appendix A reproduces the relevant survey questions. Here, workers were asked, 
“During the last 12 months, did you make a complaint, either by yourself or with co-
workers, about your working conditions, by going to your employer, supervisor or going to a 
government agency?” 
 78. Workers were asked, “During the past 12 months, were there times when you DID 
NOT complain, even though you had a problem at your job with dangerous working 
conditions, discrimination, not being paid the minimum wage or not being paid overtime?” 
and “What stopped you from complaining?” The menu of choices is listed in Appendix A. 
 79. Full regression results for the claims model are reported in Table 9 in Appendix C. 
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Table 3. Claims 
 
 
Less likely to make claim 
 
 More likely to make claim 
 
 
• Does not know minimum wage and overtime rights 
(substantive legal knowledge)* 
• Does not know where to file a government 
complaint (procedural legal knowledge)** 
• Employer is not “high road”*  
• Not a union member†  
• Age† 
• Job tenure of fewer than 12 months*** 
• Asian or other race†  
• No results 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
(N = 1422) 
 
 
 
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15 
 
The regression results summarized in Table 3 suggest that workers without 
substantive and procedural legal knowledge, as well as workers who were not 
union members or who worked for a low-road employer, were less likely to make 
claims about a workplace problem than their counterparts in the base category. In 
addition, for each additional year of age reported by a worker, the likelihood that 
she had made a claim in the twelve months before the survey decreased. Finally, 
workers who had been employed for fewer than twelve months were less likely to 
have made a claim during that time, as were workers who identified as “Asian or 
other race.”80 
These results are, on the whole, as one might expect: less powerful and 
economically stable workers appear less likely to engage in claiming behavior than 
their more powerful and stable coworkers. For example, claims may be riskier for 
older than younger workers, because if an older worker is fired in retaliation, 
finding a replacement job may be relatively more difficult.81 Likewise, nonunion 
members might be expected to make claims less frequently than their unionized 
counterparts, as they have less support and fewer channels through which to air 
their grievances. 
In addition, workers who were employed by low-road employers were less 
likely to make claims than their counterparts in the base category. At first glance, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. “Other races” include any worker who did not identify as “White,” “Black or 
African American,” or “Latino/a or Hispanic.” 
 81. See, e.g., Sewin Chan & Ann Huff Stevens, Job Loss and Employment Patterns of 
Older Workers, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 484, 485 (2001) (finding that employment rates of workers 
aged 50 and older “are substantially below the employment rates of comparably aged 
nondisplaced workers” and that “a job loss at age 50 or above has substantial and long-
lasting employment effects”). Older workers may also have more dependents to support than 
younger workers, increasing the harm caused by a retaliatory job loss and making those 
workers more reluctant to risk retaliation by making claims. 
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this result may seem counterintuitive: workers at low-road companies would 
presumably have more to complain about than their counterparts who receive 
benefits and pay raises. However, low-road employers may hire a less empowered 
workforce to begin with, or might send signals, either explicitly or implicitly by 
providing substandard wages and working conditions, that worker claims would be 
futile. 
It is also unsurprising that workers who did not know their substantive legal 
rights or how to make a government complaint were less likely to make claims than 
workers who did have this knowledge. This result squares with the self-reported 
reasons, discussed above, that workers gave for choosing not to make claims after 
identifying workplace problems: a top explanation given was that workers did not 
know how to make a claim. 
Workers who had held their job for fewer than twelve months were also less 
likely to have made a claim about a workplace problem during that time. This may 
simply reflect the opportunity (or lack thereof) to experience a problem: the longer 
a worker remains on the job, the more potential exposure she has to workplace 
problems and the more chances she has to make claims. In addition, the more 
experience a worker accrues at a job, the more valued she may feel at the company 
and the more secure she may feel in engaging in claiming behavior. 
Finally, it is difficult to explain why workers who identified as “Asian or other 
race” were less likely to make claims than other workers who identified as “White,” 
“Black or African American,” or “Latino/a or Hispanic.” As Tables 5 and 6 show, 
workers who identified as “Asian or other race” were less likely than members of 
other racial and ethnic groups to have accurate substantive and procedural legal 
knowledge. This lack of legal knowledge—itself an interesting result—probably 
contributed to these workers’ lower likelihood of engaging in claiming behavior. 
C. Retaliation 
Of the workers who had made claims about justiciable problems in the twelve 
months before the survey, about 43% experienced some form of employer reprisal 
in response to their most recent complaint.82 Of these reprisals, roughly 35% 
constituted unlawful retaliation in violation of labor and employment laws, 
including termination or suspension, calls to the police or immigration, decreases in 
hours, and abuse and harassment.83 The remaining reprisals were acts such as 
threats that likely did not rise to the level of an “adverse employment action,” a 
requirement for retaliation to be unlawful,84 but nevertheless likely had a silencing 
effect on workers. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. Workers were asked, “Did your employer or supervisor know you made this 
complaint?” and “Did your employer or supervisor do any of the following as a direct result 
of this complaint?” The menu of choices is listed in Appendix A. 
 83. To identify unlawful retaliation, the original survey team analyzed respondents’ 
descriptions of the reprisals they experienced and counted only those acts that would be 
actionable under the relevant labor and employment laws. Spiller et al., supra note 40, at 25–
26 (describing criteria used). 
 84. Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 
BAYLOR L. REV. 535 (2001) (discussing adverse employment action requirement for FLSA 
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Apart from those workers who experienced some form of retaliation, 
approximately 15% of workers reported that their employers addressed or promised 
to address the workers’ claims. The remaining workers’ employers took no action, 
ignored the workers’ claims, or engaged in some other response. 
Thus, in sum, of all workers who had made claims about justiciable workplace 
problems, about 15% experienced unlawful retaliation, 28% experienced some 
other form of reprisal, another 15% had their claims addressed or promised to be 
addressed, and 42% were met with employer inaction or some other response. 
Table 4 lists the variables that were associated with higher and lower risks of 
employer retaliation of all types, not just reprisals that would constitute violations 
of the law. Full regression results on retaliation are reported in Table 10 in 
Appendix C. 
 
Table 4. Retaliation 
 
Less likely to experience retaliation 
 
More likely to experience retaliation 
 
 
• Made claim alone*  • No results 
(N = 560) 
  
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15 
 
As Table 4 shows, we achieved only one statistically significant result with 
respect to retaliation. We suspect that a smaller number of observations (560 as 
opposed to between 1422 and 3620 for the other dependent variables) may be 
driving this outcome. It also may be explained by the very nature of retaliation. 
Individual-level worker characteristics such as gender and race/ethnicity may not 
be associated strongly with the experience of reprisals because an employer’s 
retaliatory threats or acts may be directed toward the workforce generally, as 
opposed to singling out a particular worker or workers.85 For example, an employer 
may gather the entire low-wage, front-line workforce and threaten them about the 
negative consequences of claiming behavior.86 Such threats may have a silencing 
effect across the workforce, without regard to individual worker characteristics, and 
may therefore not register in the regression analyses performed in this Part. 
Turning to the one result in Table 4, workers who made claims alone were less 
likely to experience retaliation of any type than those who complained in a group. 
This may seem counterintuitive, as individual claimants would appear to be weaker 
and more vulnerable to being “picked off” by employer retaliation. However, 
employers may perceive claims brought by groups of workers as more threatening 
than those brought by individuals, and therefore be more likely to engage in 
reprisals against group rather than individual claimants. 
                                                                                                                 
retaliation cases); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment 
Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What 
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623 (2003) (same for Title VII). 
 85. Thanks to Pauline Kim for this insight. 
 86. See, e.g., infra Part V.A (recounting a circumstance in which an entire workforce 
was likely silenced by an employer’s threats). 
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D. Substantive Legal Knowledge 
Approximately 41% of workers had accurate substantive legal knowledge in the 
area of wage and hour law, meaning that 59% misunderstood their minimum wage 
and overtime rights.87 With respect to the minimum wage, workers were asked to 
name the current applicable minimum wage in their city, and the original survey 
team checked the responses for accuracy based on the federal, state, and local laws 
in place at the time. Workers over- and underestimated the required minimum wage 
in about equal numbers: 25% gave a number below the required minimum, while 
21% gave a number above. 
Table 5 lists the variables that were associated with a greater or lesser likelihood 
of a worker’s knowing her minimum wage and overtime rights. Full substantive 
legal knowledge regression results are reported in Table 11 in Appendix C. 
 
Table 5. Substantive Legal Knowledge 
 
Less likely to know minimum wage and 
overtime rights 
 
 
More likely to know minimum wage and 
overtime rights 
 
 
• Employer has fewer than 100 
employees*** 
• Age*** 
• Black or African American***  
• White***  
• Asian or other race†  
• Not a union member* 
• No legal immigration status†  
 
 
 
(N = 3620) 
 
 
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15 
 
Here, workers who worked for relatively small employers (those with 100 or 
fewer employees) were less likely than employees of larger companies to know 
their minimum wage and overtime rights. As workers reported higher ages, the 
likelihood that they had accurate substantive legal knowledge also fell. In addition, 
workers who identified as “Black or African American,” “White,” or “Asian or 
other race” were less likely to know their minimum wage and overtime rights than 
those who identified as Latino/a or Hispanic. On the other hand, workers who were 
not union members and who had no legal immigration status (i.e. were 
undocumented workers) were more likely to report accurate knowledge of their 
wage and hour rights. 
The result with respect to employer size is relatively intuitive: smaller 
companies that lack human resources departments or formal employee screening 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Workers were asked, “As far as you know, what is the current minimum wage in 
[CITY]?” and “As far as you know, do employers have to pay workers more than their usual 
wage when they work more than 40 hours in a week?” See infra Appendix A. 
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procedures may hire a less sophisticated workforce with lower levels of legal 
knowledge. Alternatively, smaller companies may do a worse job than larger 
companies of educating their employees about workplace laws through training and 
compliance programs.88 
With respect to age, older workers may be at a disadvantage in knowing their 
minimum wage rights because the minimum wage changes over time. For example, 
the oldest respondent was eighty-one years old at the time of the survey. Since his 
or her eighteenth birthday in 1945, federal minimum wage laws have changed 
twenty-six times, California’s state minimum wage law has changed at least eleven 
times, Illinois’ at least fourteen times, and New York’s at least sixteen times.89 A 
worker may learn the minimum wage when she enters the workforce and may 
update that knowledge periodically, but may not always have accurate, current 
minimum wage information for her locality. 
Turning to the race and ethnicity results, it is unclear why members of certain 
races or ethnicities would be less likely to have substantive legal knowledge than 
members of other races. Here, “Latino/a or Hispanic” is the variable in the base 
category; workers who identified as every other race/ethnicity were less likely than 
Latino/a or Hispanic workers to know their minimum wage and overtime rights. 
This may be because Latino/a or Hispanic workers are generally overrepresented in 
the type of low-wage, front-line jobs targeted by this survey.90 Latino/a workers 
may therefore have stronger networks on the job than other workers and be more 
likely to educate one another about their wage and hour rights. Precisely because of 
that overrepresentation, these workers may also be the recipients of targeted 
know-your-rights campaigns and outreach efforts by advocacy groups, designed to 
inform Latino/a workers of their substantive legal rights.91 
Finally, the two variables associated with a greater likelihood of a worker’s 
knowing her substantive minimum wage and overtime rights, “not a union 
member” and “no legal immigration status,” appear initially to be counterintuitive. 
However, it may be that workers who are union members tend to earn relatively 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. For example, research conducted in the United Kingdom has shown that employer 
size was correlated with legal knowledge: smaller firms were “less likely to be 
knowledgeable about employment rights.” ROBERT BLACKBURN & MARK HART, SMALL 
FIRMS’ AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (Small Business 
Research Centre, Kingston Univ., Employment Relations Research Series No. 14) 70–71 
(2002). 
 89. See Wage & Hour Div., Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm 
Employment Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Apr. 
2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm#.UNHUt3ek04U; Wage & Hour 
Div., History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938–
2009, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm#.UM_ECqDyXRQ. 
 90. See, e.g., Janelle Jones & John Schmitt, Low-Wage Latino Workers, CENTER FOR 
ECON. POL’Y & RES. (Apr. 4, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/cepr
-blog/low-wage-latino-workers (concluding that, given their overall presence in the 
population, “Latinos are indeed over-represented among low-wage workers,” defined as 
those who earn $10 per hour or less). 
 91. For example, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division runs a 
campaign that specifically targets undocumented workers with wage and hour claims. Wage 
& Hour Div., We Can Help, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/wecanhelp/. 
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high wages under their particular collective bargaining agreements and are 
therefore less informed about universally applicable minimum wage requirements 
under the law.92 In addition, undocumented workers, who, like Latino/a and 
Hispanic workers, hold a disproportionate number of low-wage, front-line jobs,93 
may be the recipients of the same sort of targeted “know-your-rights” outreach 
efforts by advocacy groups discussed above. Undocumented workers may also be 
less complacent about knowing the law than their documented counterparts, as the 
law shapes their existence to a great extent, with the risk of arrest, detention, and 
deportation looming large in their working lives.94 
E. Procedural Legal Knowledge 
Approximately 23% of workers had accurate procedural legal knowledge; a 
corresponding 77% did not know where to file a workplace complaint with the 
government. Interestingly, even those workers who knew how to make a 
government complaint were unlikely to act on that knowledge, as 96% of workers 
who did make a claim on the job made it directly to their employers, rather than to 
a government agency or other third party. Moreover, the 23% result may actually 
be inflated, as a worker’s knowledge of government complaint procedures was 
self-reported, with no way for researchers to test the accuracy of workers’ 
responses.95 
Table 6 lists the variables that were associated with higher and lower likelihoods 
of a worker’s knowing where to file a government complaint.96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Faltering Middle-Class Wages, 342 
ECON. POL’Y INST. ISSUE BRIEFS 1 (2012) (reporting that workers covered by a union contract 
earn 13.6% higher wages than those without a union contract). 
 93. RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX, JEFFREY S. PASSEL, JASON OST & DAN PEREZ-LOPEZ, 
URBAN INST., BRIEF NO. 4, A PROFILE OF THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE 1 (2003) 
(finding that “[i]mmigrants compose an increasingly large share of the U.S. labor force and a 
growing share of low-wage workers” and “[t]wo of every five low-wage immigrant workers 
are undocumented”). 
 94. Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant 
Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 563 (2010) (contending 
that, “like the holistic experiences of race, class, and gender,” “undocumented status is 
similarly a master status that is constructed by the law and that in turn shapes an individual’s 
relationship to the law” (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 95. Workers were asked, “Do you know where to file a complaint with the government 
if you are having a problem with an employer?” See infra Appendix A. 
 96. Full procedural legal knowledge regression results are reported in Table 12 in 
Appendix C. 
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Table 6. Procedural Legal Knowledge 
 
Less likely to know where to file 
government complaint 
 
More likely to know where to file 
government complaint 
 
 
• Female***  
• No legal immigration status***  
• Employer is not “high road”***  
• Asian or other race**  
• Age*** 
• Education** 
• Black or African American** 
 
 
(N = 3606) 
  
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15 
 
As Table 6 shows, women, workers without legal immigration status, workers 
employed by low-road employers, and those who identified as “Asian or other 
race” were all less likely than those in the base category to know where to file a 
workplace complaint with a government agency. On the other hand, increasing age, 
education, and identification as “Black or African American” were associated with 
a greater likelihood of a worker’s having accurate procedural legal knowledge. 
These results generally follow from theory. Low-wage, front-line women, who 
have lower social standing than their male counterparts, may have had less 
exposure than men to information about government complaint procedures. And 
undocumented workers, despite having relatively greater substantive legal 
knowledge, might not know how to make a government complaint because of an 
overarching view that government contact of any sort would risk detection and 
deportation.97 
The result regarding low-road employers is also consistent with intuition: 
low-road employers may be less likely to educate their workers about government 
complaint procedures, or may hire workers who are a priori less knowledgeable 
about their procedural legal rights. In addition, workers who identified as “Asian or 
other race” were less likely to have procedural legal knowledge. As with the results 
in Tables 3 and 5, some cultural norm against claiming may be in effect, resulting 
in workers who identify as “Asian or other race” being less likely to have legal 
knowledge or engage in claiming behavior. 
On the flip side, age, education, and identification as “Black or African 
American” were positively associated with accurate procedural legal knowledge. 
With respect to age, unlike the substantive wage and hour laws, channels for 
government complaint tend not to change over time. One would therefore expect 
procedural legal knowledge to increase as workers grow older and have more 
exposure to workplace problems and channels for complaint. In addition, workers 
with higher levels of education overall may know more about how to lodge a 
government complaint than those with fewer years of schooling. Finally, workers’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1089, 1101–03 (2011) (discussing unauthorized immigrants’ mistrust of even friendly or 
status-neutral U.S. government institutions). 
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identification as “Black or African American” may be positively correlated with 
procedural legal knowledge because African Americans may have a comparatively 
longer history of seeking government redress for legal wrongs than other racial or 
ethnic groups. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTTOM-UP WORKPLACE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Taken together, the results reported in Part III suggest some conclusions about 
the empirics of workplace dispute generation and resolution and the functioning of 
our system of bottom-up workplace law enforcement. First, though our workplace 
law enforcement regime is designed to identify, surface, and resolve justiciable 
problems from the bottom up, some number of actual workplace rights violations 
are never even identified, or “named,” by workers. This can be seen in Figure 2, 
which synthesizes the findings reported in Part III and replicates a workplace 
dispute pyramid, turned on its side. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Workplace problems, claims, and employer responses. 
* Because of a small number of observations, RDSAT was not able to generate a population 
point estimate for the 42% figure, which is therefore a very rough estimate. 
 
As the left-most column shows, though the original survey team calculated rates 
of actual wage and hour law violations of up to 76%, only about 33% of workers 
“named” a workplace problem. This slippage between actual and perceived 
workplace problems may be attributed to workers’ lack of substantive legal 
knowledge: about 59% of workers did not know their minimum wage and overtime 
rights. Moreover, as the workplace problem regression results in Table 2, supra, 
reflect, less politically, socially, and economically powerful and secure workers—
women workers, older workers, nonunion workers—were less likely to engage in 
the process of “naming” workplace problems. “Naming” therefore represents a 
point where claims are escaping from the workplace dispute pyramid, confounding 
the expectations of our bottom-up system of workplace law enforcement. 
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Second, claiming is another point of escape from the pyramid. As the second 
column in Figure 2 illustrates, about 33% of workers had identified workplace 
problems, but 43% of those workers chose not to make claims. It is unknown from 
these data whether workers chose silent loyalty or exit instead of voice. However, 
median job tenure among survey respondents was 2.25 years,98 about half the 
national median,99 suggesting that many workers may have chosen to exit their jobs 
after having identified workplace problems. 
Third, nearly all of the claims that workers made—represented by the second 
column in Figure 2—were internal, made directly to the employer, while only 
about 4% of workers chose to make claims in the form of a lawsuit or government 
complaint. This may be attributed to workers’ general lack of procedural legal 
knowledge: only 22% knew where to file a government complaint. Yet the 4% 
external complaint figure suggests that even procedurally knowledgeable workers 
may have been unlikely to act on their knowledge, perhaps pointing to a problem 
with workers’ incentives around claiming.100 
Fourth, though we do not know from these data why some workers chose to 
make claims, we do know that the workers who chose not to engage in claiming 
behavior did so because they feared retaliation or doubted the efficacy of claims 
making. The third column in Figure 2 shows that these beliefs were rational: about 
43% of workers who had made a justiciable claim experienced some form of 
retaliation for their most recent claim. In addition, when asked why they chose not 
to make a claim, 14% of workers reported having witnessed a coworker being 
retaliated against. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, of the workers who did make 
claims about justiciable workplace problems, only 15% of employers addressed 
those claims or promised to do so, while roughly 42% simply ignored the claims or 
gave some other response. These statistics again suggest failures in workers’ 
incentives to make claims. 
Thus, the results reported in Part III support our contention that the bottom-up 
workplace law enforcement regime may be failing the very workers who most need 
protection. Workers do not simply progress up the workplace dispute pyramid 
through consecutive phases of naming, blaming, claiming, and resolution. Instead, 
our analysis of the Unregulated Work Survey data suggests that workers are 
shunted off the pyramid, at minimum, at the naming and claiming stages. We 
contend that this drop-off occurs because low-wage, front-line workers often lack 
the legal knowledge and incentives needed for bottom-up workplace law 
enforcement. Compounding this problem, claiming incentives and legal knowledge 
are distributed unevenly among workers. As our analysis suggests, the least 
politically, economically, and socially powerful and secure workers were the least 
likely to make claims, the most likely to experience retaliation, and the least likely 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Analysis available from authors. 
 99. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL 08-1344, EMPLOYEE 
TENURE IN 2008 1 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives
/tenure_09262008.pdf (“The median number of years that wage and salary workers had been 
with their current employer was 4.1 years in January 2008.”). 
 100. We do not know whether some workers who initially made internal claims later 
chose to pursue their claims as lawsuits or government complaints. 
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to have accurate substantive and procedural legal knowledge: women, workers 
without legal immigration status, and workers with low education levels. 
These findings are consistent with other research on worker claiming behavior, 
retaliation patterns, and legal knowledge.101 For example, David Weil and Amanda 
Pyles have characterized the frequency of worker complaints to the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division and Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration as “exceedingly low,” concluding: 
Under [the Fair Labor Standards Act], although an average of about 
29,000 workers complained each year between 2001 and 2004, when 
deflated by the total number of workers, this amounts to an average of 
less than 25 complaint cases for every 100,000 workers. The rate was 
even lower for [complaints under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act] over the same period, averaging a mere 17 complaints for every 
100,000 workers.102 
Weil and Pyles also echo our findings on the distribution of claiming behavior, 
noting that “workers [who] feel vulnerable to exploitation are less likely to use their 
rights—these include immigrant workers, those with less education or fewer skills, 
and those in smaller workplaces or in sectors prone to a high degree of informal 
work arrangements.”103 Other researchers have made similar observations in the 
area of employment discrimination: 
[I]t is not clear that litigation protects all kinds of employees equally 
well. Most employment discrimination suits are brought by employees 
who have already left the job where the discrimination took place. 
Further, those ex-employees who bring suit tend to come from the 
ranks of managers and professionals rather than from lower-level 
workers.104 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Research on crime-victim reporting patterns is also relevant here. For example, 
“[r]esearch indicates that the utilization of formal support services by victims of crime is 
relatively low” and that victim characteristics like gender and ethnicity influence the 
likelihood of help seeking. Michael R. McCart, Daniel W. Smith & Genelle K. Sawyer, Help 
Seeking Among Victims of Crime: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 23 J. TRAUMATIC 
STRESS 198, 199–200 (2010). Thanks to Leah Daigle for identifying this literature. 
 102. Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 69; see also Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, 
Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 76 (1986) 
(reporting in study of suit filing among public sector workers in Illinois that “filing is a rare 
event,” and “[o]nly 63 of 876 people filed suits (or charges)” regarding workplace 
problems). 
 103. Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 91; see also Mitchell Langbert, Voice Asymmetries in 
ERISA Litigation, 16 J. LAB. RES. 455, 462–63 (1995) (noting underrepresentation of women 
as plaintiffs in ERISA lawsuits); Willborn, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that workers who sue 
tend to be “considerably wealthier than the average employee”). 
 104. U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS—FINAL REPORT 49–50 
(1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004
&context=key_workplace; see also Brake, supra note 72 at 36 (“[T]he social costs of 
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With respect to retaliation, a 2012 report by the Ethics Resource Center on the 
incidence of retaliation against whistleblowers (workers who uncover and report 
unlawful conduct within their companies) found that 45% of employees “observe 
misconduct each year,” 65% of those workers blow the whistle, and about one in 
five, or 22% of those who choose to become whistleblowers, “perceives retaliation 
for doing so.”105 Other studies in a variety of employment settings have found that 
fear of retaliation is often the main driver of workers’ decisions not to confront the 
workplace problems they identify.106 
Other researchers have also found that low-wage, front-line workers routinely 
misunderstand their workplace rights. A survey of low-income Latino workers in 
Southern states found that “[m]ost people surveyed (about eighty percent) had no 
idea how to contact government enforcement agencies such as the Department of 
Labor. Many respondents did not know such agencies even exist.”107 Similarly, 
only about half of day laborers in an Arizona survey knew the minimum wage, 
while a survey of over two thousand contingent workers in twenty states and the 
District of Columbia found that 70% of respondents did not know where to report 
                                                                                                                 
claiming discrimination are primarily reserved for low-power or stigmatized social 
groups.”); Lauren B. Edelman, Scott R. Eliason, Virginia Mellema, Linda H. Krieger & 
Catherine R. Albiston, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized 
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 904 (2011) (“Research shows that minorities 
and the poor face substantial obstacles in mobilizing legal rights ranging from psychological 
and structural barriers to filing claims, to weaker legal counsel, to structural aspects of 
litigation that disadvantage parties that lack social clout.” (citations omitted)); Nielsen & 
Nelson, supra note 29, at 685 (collecting studies of discrimination claims-making; noting 
that relatively few employees who have identified a problem with workplace discrimination 
made a claim). 
 105. ETHICS RES. CTR., RETALIATION: WHEN WHISTLEBLOWERS BECOME VICTIMS: A 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2 (2012), 
available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes/index.php. 
 106. Brake, supra note 72, at 28 (collecting citations to studies) (“Most of the research on 
the low level of reporting discrimination has been done in the area of sexual harassment. 
Social science literature on sexual harassment abounds with findings showing that sexually 
harassed women most often choose coping strategies of avoidance or denial and that the least 
likely response is to report the harassment to someone in a position of authority.”); Gleeson, 
supra note 66, at 13 (“A significant portion of workers [in a study of low-wage workers in 
the San Francisco, California, area] attempt to negotiate with their employer before seeking 
legal counsel, yet those who lack English proficiency, and those in the restaurant industry 
(which represents one of the largest and least unionized employers in the private sector) are 
more likely to have their attempts met with threats. Fear of job loss remains a big hurdle for 
workers, who are less likely to approach a government agency directly before coming to a 
law clinic if they are still employed, despite clear formal protections against retaliation.”); cf. 
EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, LEAVES THAT 
PAY: EMPLOYER AND WORKER EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 4–5 
(2011), available at http://www.cepr.net/publications/reports/leaves-that-pay (finding that 
over one-third of workers “for whom data are available were worried that if they took [paid 
family leave for which they were eligible under California law], their employer would be 
unhappy, that their opportunities for advancement would be affected, or that they might 
actually be fired”). 
 107. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE SOUTH 6 
(2009), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/UnderSiege.pdf. 
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workplace abuses.108 Likewise, a study of the sexual harassment policy of a large 
Midwestern university reported that many administrative and clerical women 
employees—relatively more powerful, secure employees compared to the 
low-wage, front-line workers surveyed here—were confused about sexual 
harassment law as it applied to them.109 
Stephen Lee has written about the conditions that give rise to inaccurate 
substantive and procedural legal knowledge among low-wage, front-line immigrant 
workers in particular. As he has observed, undocumented workers may perceive 
government enforcers of labor rights as enforcers of immigration law as well.110 As 
a result, they may choose not to report a workplace problem to a government 
agency for fear that the report will trigger immigration consequences. Immigrant 
workers may also import legal knowledge from their home countries that is 
inapplicable in their U.S. workplaces and derive inaccurate beliefs about their 
workplace rights from relatively insular information “islands” and ethnic 
networks.111 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. Mary Nell Trautner, Erin Hatton & Kelly E. Smith, What Workers Want Depends: 
Legal Knowledge and the Desire for Workplace Change Among Day Laborers, 35 LAW & 
POL’Y 319 (2013); ABEL VALENZUELA JR., NIK THEODORE, EDWIN MELÉNDEZ & ANA LUZ 
GONZALEZ, ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 16 tbl.7 (2006), available at 
http://www.urbaneconomy.org/sites/default/files/onthecorner_daylaborinUS_39p_2006.pdf 
(cited in Gleeson, supra note 94 at 562). 
 109. Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the 
Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 115 (2005); see also 
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of 
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110, 133 (1998) (quizzing 
over 330 unemployed workers on knowledge of at-will employment legal rules and finding 
that workers gave correct answers only 51% of the time on average); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, 
Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 447, 458 (administering the same survey in multiple additional states; finding 
corresponding correct answer rates ranging from 25.2% to 40%); Weil, supra note 23, at 5 
n.6 (summarizing the “literature on the lack of knowledge of statutory rights under a variety 
of laws”). 
 110. See Lee, supra note 97, at 1101–03 (discussing unauthorized immigrants’ mistrust 
of even friendly or status-neutral U.S. government institutions). This mistrust is rational, 
given immigration agents’ history of such tactics as disguising themselves as labor officials 
in order to locate, detain, and deport undocumented workers. See U.S. Ends Job “Safety” 
Immigration Raids, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 29, 2006, available at 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2006/U-S-Ends-Job-Safety-Immigration-Raids/id-e232
4a8e97a434063791bb95b30ff419 (describing immigration agents masquerading as 
occupational health and safety workers). The mistrust persists despite a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the U.S. Departments of Labor and Homeland Security that requires 
immigration authorities to proceed with caution in detaining and deporting workers involved 
in a labor dispute. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REVISED 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
AND LABOR CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/HispanicLaborForce/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf. 
 111. As Jennifer Gordon, R.A. Lenhardt, and Shannon Gleeson have observed, 
undocumented workers may also lack the legal consciousness, or view of themselves in 
relation to the law, to make claims. Gleeson, supra note 94, at 590 (“When asked why they 
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A. The Failure of Operational Rights 
The drafters of the major federal labor and employment laws were not blind to 
the possibility that workers would need incentives to become the drivers of 
workplace law enforcement in a bottom-up system.112 As a result, they wrote into 
the laws a set of protections and inducements that were meant to tip workers’ 
cost-benefit scales in the direction of claims making. We call these “operational 
rights” because they operationalize or effectuate substantive statutory 
protections.113 
Operational rights implicitly acknowledge a major contention of this Article, 
that workers’ incentives are a key determinant of claiming behavior.114 More 
precisely, workers assess the size of the possible benefit they might receive as a 
result of a claim, the certainty of receiving that benefit, and how costly the benefit 
will be to achieve. They weigh these factors against the benefits and costs of their 
                                                                                                                 
chose not to come forward about long days or dangerous working conditions, many 
undocumented workers repeatedly explained that to do so would simply not be characteristic 
of a good worker, championing their willingness to do work others would not.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 1161, 1223 (2008) (labeling undocumented workers’ view of themselves as 
hardworking and uncomplaining “identity work designed to respond in some way to the 
negative stereotypes and stigma associated with their particular groups”); see also Catherine 
R. Albiston, Legal Consciousness and Workplace Rights, in NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH: A 
CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH 55, 56 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds., 2006) 
(defining legal consciousness as “the dynamic process through which actors draw on legal 
discourse to construct their understanding of and relation to the social world, but that process 
takes place within a social context already structured in part by the law itself”). 
 112. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) 
(“Congress did not seek to secure compliance with [the FLSA’s] prescribed standards 
through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to 
rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights 
claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if 
employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. This ends the prohibition of 
[the statute] against discharges and other discriminatory practices was designed to serve. For 
it needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce 
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions. By the proscription of 
retaliatory acts set forth in [the FLSA] . . . Congress sought to foster a climate in which 
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 113. Alexander, supra note 20, at 386; see also Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to 
Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 783 (2011) (discussing “suit boosters” or incentives offered to 
plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring private litigation). 
 114. See also Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 102, at 63 (“The three factors which 
determine whether women will file are: 1) expected benefits which are a function of future 
positions (job property rights) available in jobs without discrimination; 2) expected costs of 
relief (financial and other); 3) resources which are used to file suit rather than pursue other 
jobs.”); id. at 62 (“An employee calculates the cost of filing a complaint based on an 
estimate of the risks associated with any action to seek relief from discrimination.”); Weil & 
Pyles, supra note 7, at 91 (“The likelihood that workers exercise their rights depends on both 
the benefits and the risks of doing so. . . .”). 
2014] BOTTOM-UP WORKPLACE LAW ENFORCEMENT 1103 
 
other options: exit or silent loyalty. Operational rights attempt to increase the size 
and certainty of the benefit and reduce the costs of achieving it.115 
In the context of private lawsuits, operational rights offer payment (sometimes 
double116) for violations of a plaintiff’s rights and extra payments to class 
representatives.117 These supplement the benefits that would accrue anyway to 
plaintiffs who are successful in a workplace lawsuit: the opportunity to work for an 
employer who now complies with the law and the chance to see justice done. 
Operational rights also seek to minimize the costs of claiming. They offer the 
chance for reimbursed attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs, and they outlaw 
retaliation and provide a private right of action for workers who have been 
retaliated against.118 They also allow workers to band together in class or collective 
actions to bring joint claims against their employer.119 
In the context of government complaints, operational rights also include 
agencies’ ability to litigate claims on workers’ behalf at no financial cost to the 
worker, their capacity to collect workers’ back pay and other damages owed to 
them,120 and agencies’ promise to keep complainants’ identities confidential, at 
least during the initial, prelitigation phases of an investigation.121 
Yet our analysis of the Unregulated Work Survey data suggests that, despite 
their promise, operational rights may be largely ineffective in tipping many 
workers’ cost-benefit analyses in the direction of claims. Indeed, those workers 
who did make claims nearly universally did so internally, and never filed a lawsuit 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. See Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 91–92. 
 116. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiffs may collect double their lost wages as 
liquidated damages, unless the defendant shows that its violation of the FLSA was in good 
faith. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260 (2006). 
 117. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing class 
representative incentive payments). 
 118. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s fee 
shifting provision); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (same for the FLSA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) 
(Title VII’s antiretaliation provision); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (same for the FLSA); see 
also Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (describing the 
purpose of antiretaliation protections in encouraging lawsuits). 
 119. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (allowing FLSA plaintiffs to form collective actions by 
individually opting into a lawsuit); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (allowing plaintiff class actions). 
 120. For a description of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division’s 
ability to litigate on behalf of and collect workers’ unpaid back wages, see WEIL, supra note 
3, passim. For a description of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
capabilities in these areas, see Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm. 
 121. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission keep employee charges of discrimination confidential 
from the public (though not from the defendant), under penalty of a $1,000 fine or 
imprisonment of up to one year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). See also Solis v. Seafood Peddler 
of San Rafael, No. C 12-0116 PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172137, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
4, 2012) (noting that the U.S. Department of Labor may “use the ‘confidential informant’s 
privilege’ to shield the identity of the reporting employee(s),” but that “even plaintiff 
concedes that the defendants will eventually need to learn the identities of the informants 
‘for purposes of trial preparation and impeachment’”). 
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or made a government complaint. For low-wage, front-line workers, the costs of 
this sort of external, formal claim may be too great, and on the other side of the 
scale, the benefits too small.122 
First, statutory antiretaliation provisions often do not work, and workers know 
this. As Emily Spieler has observed in the context of workers’ compensation, 
“[r]etaliatory discharge lawsuits are a useful tool primarily for professionals, 
managerial, and other upper income workers,” but not for the low-wage, front-line 
workers studied here.123 Likewise, Pauline Kim points out, quoting Cynthia 
Estlund: 
Anti-retaliation remedies can be invoked only after the employee has 
suffered discharge or discipline, and offer, at best, the possibility of an 
uncertain remedy after a long delay. . . . Given the difficulties of 
pursuing a retaliation claim, [Estlund] argues, “all but the most intrepid 
employees will be deterred, or ‘chilled’ from speaking out in ways that 
might provoke the employer’s displeasure.” 
 To put the point more directly, speaking out at the workplace in the 
ways that the law encourages is hard.124 
Indeed, in our analysis, about 43% of workers who had made claims in the 
twelve months prior to the survey had been retaliated against for their most recent 
claim. The workers who chose not to make claims listed retaliation-related issues (a 
fear of being fired, a fear of having wages or hours cut, and the worker’s 
knowledge of retaliation against other workers who had made claims) as three of 
the top four reasons they decided to stay silent. 
Statutory antiretaliation provisions are simply too narrow and too back-loaded to 
be effective in protecting low-wage, front-line workers. The “remedy” that labor 
and employment law offers workers who have been retaliated against is a chance to 
bring a retaliation claim in court, which may or may not be successful, and which 
may be cold (and late) comfort to a worker who has already lost her job, been 
deported, or suffered other adverse employment actions. And with the exception of 
the FLSA, which offers double damages, a successful retaliation plaintiff is only 
restored to her position ex ante, receiving back pay and possibly reinstatement, and 
often is not compensated for the costs of the retaliation itself. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Weil, supra note 23, at 3 (“[T]he need to keep one’s job trumps other considerations 
such as being denied overtime pay or potential exposures to health hazards, let alone issues 
related to supervisory treatment that may have no direct legal consequence.”). 
 123. Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers’ Compensation and the Persistence 
of Occupational Injuries, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 119, 230 (1994); see also Langbert, supra note 
103, at 459 (“Like other individual rights regulation, ERISA’s emphasis on court remedies 
may prove to be of mostly symbolic value for plaintiffs most in need of protection: those 
who are low-wage.”). 
 124. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
901, 928 (2012) (quoting Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the 
Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 135 (1995)); see also Brake, supra note 72, at 20 (“To a large 
extent, the effectiveness and very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on people’s ability 
to raise concerns about discrimination without fear of retaliation.”). 
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In addition, despite some recent broadening of retaliation protections under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Labor Standards Act by the 
U.S. Supreme Court,125 retaliation’s definition in workplace statutes and its 
interpretation by courts tends to be quite narrow. For example, an employer’s 
threats to retaliate may not themselves be actionable, even though they may be just 
as effective in silencing workers as when threats are carried out.126 Moreover, 
employers may effectively retaliate against one complaining worker as an example 
to the rest of the workforce: that one worker may have a cause of action for 
retaliation, but her coworkers, who are now scared silent, have no remedy. 
For plaintiffs who are undocumented or hold work-contingent visas, the 
consequences of retaliation may be especially severe. These workers risk losing not 
only their job as a result of a workplace claim, but also their home, as their 
employers may report them to immigration authorities.127 Because the downsides 
include not only job loss, but also loss of a visa and removal from the country, 
workplace claiming becomes even more risky in the transnational labor market in 
which immigrants work.128 
Second, while complaining to a government agency offers some increased level 
of protection—a guarantee of confidentiality, at least initially—a complainant’s 
identity must eventually be revealed to an employer once a case moves into 
litigation or another form of dispute resolution.129 In this way, a worker’s costs may 
increase over the course of the claiming process, requiring the worker to repeatedly 
reassess the costs and benefits of claims making. In addition, incompetence and 
processing delays may render government agencies an unattractive forum for 
workers seeking effective and timely redress for workplace problems.130 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 
(2011) (holding that an oral complaint under the FLSA counted as a protected activity for 
purposes of the statute’s antiretaliation provisions); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 
S. Ct. 863, 867–68 (2011) (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provisions covered 
“third-party retaliation,” or reprisals against people associated with the worker who engaged 
in protected activity). 
 126. See, e.g., Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding in a 
Title VII case that an employer’s threats to suspend an employee did not amount to “material 
adversity” that was actionable under the statute’s antiretaliation provisions). 
 127. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 886–87 (1984) (describing 
employer’s retaliatory reporting of undocumented workers who had engaged in union 
organizing to immigration authorities, which either deported the workers or accepted their 
voluntary departure from the United States). 
 128. Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case 
Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 378–79 (2012) (discussing consequences of 
retaliation for immigrant workers). 
 129. See, e.g., Confidentiality, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/confidentiality.cfm (“Once a charge is filed, the individual's 
name and basic information about the allegations of discrimination will be disclosed to the 
employer.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Highlights to U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, WAGE 
AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE 
WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT (2009) (“[The Government Accountability 
Office’s] overall assessment of the [Wage and Hour Division] complaint intake, conciliation, 
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Against these costs, the benefits of claiming appear paltry. Though back pay 
may be available to a plaintiff at the end of a lawsuit, if that amount is 
insufficiently large—and for plaintiffs who sue because they were paid less than 
the minimum wage, back pay awards will, by definition, be quite small—then 
enduring the uncertain, stressful, drawn-out process of litigation may not be worth 
it.131 Moreover, our analysis reveals that workers doubt the certainty of the benefit 
they might receive from claims making: the second-most frequent reason for 
workers’ choices not to make claims was that workers doubted their claims would 
make any difference. (On top of this, some measure of substantive and procedural 
legal knowledge may be necessary for workers even to know what benefits may be 
available to them at the end of a lawsuit or government complaint process.) 
Changing legal standards have also made it harder for groups of workers to 
bring claims as class actions and access the benefit of joint representation.132 In 
addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act have never allowed traditional class actions, in which a few 
named plaintiffs represent a largely anonymous class, but instead require each 
individual additional plaintiff to affirmatively opt into a case.133 As a result, 
workers are increasingly forced to bring cases alone or in small groups, with each 
worker’s identity exposed, setting the stage for retaliation by unscrupulous 
employers. 
Thus, the failure of operational rights to create appropriate incentives in either 
the context of private lawsuits or government complaints means that the risk 
associated with enforcement is shifted to the parties who can least bear it. The 
workers who are most vulnerable to workplace rights violations in the first place 
are also especially unable to bear the costs associated with claiming. As a result, 
the would-be law enforcers for whom costs are particularly heavy, the low-wage, 
front-line workers studied here, may choose simply to stay silent or to exit and drop 
out of the workplace dispute pyramid altogether. 
                                                                                                                 
and investigation processes found an ineffective system that discourages wage theft 
complaints.”). 
 131. Willborn, supra note 10, at 7 (“[V]ictims with larger potential awards will be more 
likely to enforce for a number of related reasons, such as their ability to obtain counsel, the 
likelihood that the award will be larger than the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of suit, 
and the likelihood that the expected recovery will still exceed expected costs even as the 
probability of winning decreases.”). 
 132. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) (discussing Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes and AT&T Mobility Limited Liability Company v. Concepcion, which narrowed the 
availability of class actions to employment plaintiffs); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming 
the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 187 (discussing multiple ways that 
court decisions have narrowed the ability of private individuals to bring suit to seek redress 
for rights violations). 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (incorporating the FLSA’s opt-in requirement into the 
Equal Pay Act, which in any case is technically a part of the FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(2006) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any [FLSA] action unless he gives his 
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which 
such action is brought.”); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006) (incorporating the FLSA’s opt-in 
requirement into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
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B. Self-Perpetuating Enforcement Gap 
Despite this gloomy picture of workplace law enforcement, it is important to 
note that workplace claiming does occur. In fact, private claims under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act have risen dramatically over the past decade.134 However, 
research has shown that only about 15% of eligible workers opt into, or participate 
in, each case.135 This suggests a claiming gap: 85% of workers who could become 
bottom-up enforcers of the FLSA and demand their unpaid minimum wage or 
overtime pay choose instead not to participate in litigation.136 
Likewise, workers do complain to government agencies about workplace 
problems, but those complaints may not be coming from the workplaces most in 
need of agency enforcement. For example, an analysis of wage and hour complaints 
to the U.S. Department of Labor found an “average of less than 25 complaint cases 
for every 100,000 workers” and “only modest overlap” between complaints and 
employers’ compliance with Fair Labor Standards Act requirements.137 In other 
words, the “market” in complaints may be failing to identify the workplaces most 
in need of agency intervention.138 
This produces, in the end, a self-perpetuating enforcement gap in low-wage 
workplaces, in which worker claims are the driver of workplace law enforcement 
but only about half of workers are likely to make claims. Employers know this, and 
the unscrupulous among them feel free to underpay workers’ wages, discriminate, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. See Table C-2A: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit, 
During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2008 Through 2012, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices
/C02ASep12.pdf (listing 5393 Fair Labor Standards Act cases filed in federal court in fiscal 
year 2008 compared to 8152 cases filed in fiscal year 2012). 
 135. Charlotte S. Alexander, Would an Opt In Requirement Fix the Class Action 
Settlement? Evidence from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 MISS. L.J. 443, 466 (2010) 
(reporting opt-in rate in FLSA cases of 15%); see also Rutti v. Lojack Corp., No. SACV 06-
350 DOC (JCx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107677, *14–20 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) (noting 
problems with the FLSA opt-in structure that tend to discourage opting in by fearful, 
apathetic, inertia-bound workers, and those who lack legal knowledge). 
 136. Moreover, most of the FLSA suits that are filed are likely brought by managers 
claiming to have been illegally misclassified as exempt from overtime, not by low-wage, 
front-line workers who are making minimum wage claims. 
 137. Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 69, 73. 
 138. For statistics on the background level of workplace rights violations in low-wage 
workplaces, see BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2 (“We found that many employment 
and labor laws are regularly and systematically violated, impacting a significant part of the 
low-wage labor force in the nation’s largest cities.”); Donald M. Kerwin with Kristin 
McCabe, Labor Standards Enforcement and Low-Wage Immigrants: Creating an Effective 
Enforcement System, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 21 (2011) (claiming that “there is substantial 
evidence that unauthorized immigrants work at high rates in industries with long track 
records of labor standards violations” and listing agriculture, meat, poultry, and fish 
processing, garment assembly, and sewing as industries in which wage and hour violations 
are “endemic”); Siobhán McGrath, A Survey of Literature Estimating the Prevalence of 
Employment and Labor Law Violations in the U.S., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 15, 
2005), http://brennan.3cdn.net/bdeabea099b7581a26_srm6br9zf.pdf. 
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maintain unsafe working conditions, engage in unfair labor practices, and otherwise 
violate workers’ rights with relative impunity.139 Workers are overdeterred from 
claiming, while employers are underdeterred from complying. 
V. ALTERNATIVES 
This Part examines alternatives to the current bottom-up workplace law 
enforcement regime. Heeding John Coffee’s admonition that “the academic 
reformer has a duty to specify not only what the optimal solution is, but what the 
first tentative steps are that should be taken toward it,”140 we first propose reforms 
that would address the problems of lack of legal knowledge and claiming 
incentives among low-wage, front-line workers. These changes would preserve the 
bottom-up structure of workplace law enforcement, but would attempt to do a 
better job of increasing benefits and decreasing costs than the present system of 
operational rights, thereby preventing claims from escaping the workplace dispute 
pyramid. 
Possible reforms include minimizing bottom-up enforcers’ costs by 
strengthening retaliation protections, eliminating the opt-in requirement of some 
employment statutes, and establishing an arbitration system that workers could 
choose to access to achieve a quick resolution of their claims. On the benefits side, 
we consider sweetening the proverbial pot by lifting damages caps, offering treble 
damages, and making punitive damages more readily available.141 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. As Weil and Pyles put it, “an instrinsic [sic] problem arising from the statutory 
structure of workplace rights is that if left to the decision of an individual worker, the 
threshold for exercise of rights lies above the threshold optimal from the workplace—and 
societal—level.” Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 86. 
 140. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 286 (1983). 
 141. Each of these solutions focuses specifically on reforming bottom-up workplace law 
enforcement rather than empowering workers generally to change conditions at work. If this 
were the broader goal, then union organizing and worker centers, among other solidarity-
building strategies, would certainly need to be added to the mix. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, 
We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the 
Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995) (describing the 
operation of a worker center in advocating for worker rights and empowerment). In fact, 
Allison Morantz has demonstrated that the unionization of a workplace can not only 
empower workers, but also increase legal compliance, at least in the area of mine health and 
safety. Alison D. Morantz, Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference?, 66 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 88 (2013). In addition, other reform methods harnessing technology and 
market discipline are possible. For example, the U.S. Department of Labor has recently 
developed a smartphone app that allows consumers to research whether a particular business 
owes its employees back wages or has been cited for health and safety violations. R. Moore, 
Eat Shop Sleep, ITUNES, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/eat-shop-sleep/id465262611?mt=8 
(app updated Mar. 19, 2012). Similarly, the new initiative Coworker.org allows workers to 
launch online petitions and organize themselves virtually across companies and industries to 
call attention to problems on the job. COWORKER.ORG, http://www.coworker.org/. Finally, 
including better measures of job quality in corporate social responsibility (CSR) indices 
might recruit activist consumers to the project of improving low-wage work by directing 
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Second, we consider workplace law enforcement regimes that would rely less 
heavily on workers themselves to initiate claims. Here, we propose increasing 
top-down, government investigative, and prosecutorial activity, and setting 
government enforcement priorities such that agencies take action in the workplaces 
where workers are least likely to step forward themselves. This set of proposals is 
far from comprehensive, and is meant to complement calls for reform previously 
suggested by other scholars and advocates.142 
Of course, proposals to increase the level of workplace law enforcement beg the 
question of what the desirable level of enforcement is in the first place.143 One’s 
answer might depend on whether one is an employer or an employee, or whether 
one is more likely to become a claimant in a workplace dispute or the target of such 
a claim. Nevertheless, increased enforcement of labor and employment standards 
would likely benefit both employers and employees. Employees benefit from 
lawful pay, safe working conditions, and nondiscriminatory policies; employers 
benefit by operating on a level playing field, without being undercut by competitors 
who save money by paying lower wages, skimping on costly safety measures, or 
otherwise disregarding their legal obligations. Indeed, though one might argue that 
increased workplace law enforcement could increase employers’ costs and thereby 
eliminate jobs, legal compliance should not be an optional cost. At the very least, 
any given employer’s legal compliance should not hinge on the characteristics of 
its workforce, with employers of low-wage, front-line workers particularly able to 
evade detection by silencing potential claims.144 
                                                                                                                 
their dollars toward companies with high CSR values in the labor and employment category. 
See, e.g., Leonardo Becchetti & Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock 
Market Performance, 19 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 1283 (2009) (describing corporate social 
responsibility rankings issued by RiskMetrics-KLD, which include items around employee 
relations). 
 142. See, e.g., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, JUST PAY: IMPROVING WAGE AND HOUR 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (2010), available at http://www
.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2010/JustPayReport2010.pdf?nocdn=1 (proposing improvements to the 
U.S. Department of Labor’s operations); Estlund, supra note 6, at 319 (proposing monitored 
self-regulation of company compliance with labor standards); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable 
and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective 
Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179 (1994) (making a series of proposals for FLSA reform); 
Daniel C. Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class 
Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 308 (2009) (same); WEIL, supra 
note 3 (proposing improvements to the U.S. Department of Labor’s operations). 
 143. For an attempt to identify rational criteria for enforcement of laws, see, for example, 
George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 55 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974); see also 
Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9 (2010) 
(discussing methods of optimizing law enforcement). 
 144. The question of whether increased workplace law enforcement would in fact 
decrease employment levels is an empirical one that merits study. Similar predictions have 
been made with respect to the negative effects of a minimum wage increase on employment 
levels, but repeated studies have called these theories into question. See, e.g., Liana Fox, 
Minimum Wage Trends: Understanding Past and Contemporary Research at 1 (Econ. Policy 
Inst., Briefing Paper No. 178, 2006) (“There is a growing view among economists that the 
minimum wage offers substantial benefits to low-wage workers without negative effect. 
Although there are still dissenters, the best recent research has shown that the job loss 
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A. Disseminating Legal Knowledge 
At first glance, the goal of disseminating legal knowledge—a necessary 
condition for workplace claims—would seem to be low hanging policy fruit. 
However, educating workers effectively about their substantive and procedural 
legal rights is a relatively complex and difficult endeavor. Many employers, 
including those covered by the Unregulated Work Survey, are already required to 
post information on a variety of workers’ rights. In fact, the U.S. Department of 
Labor provides eleven different “know your rights” posters, in a variety of 
languages, that employers may be required to display in the workplace.145 Yet our 
findings that approximately 59% of low-wage, front-line workers did not know 
their minimum wage and overtime rights and 78% did not know how to file a 
government complaint (both subjects of Department of Labor posters) suggest that 
this method of disseminating legal knowledge is highly ineffective. Moreover, 
Pauline Kim’s theory that powerful social norms can override explicit employer-
provided messages about legal rights calls into question whether the workplace is 
the most appropriate place for educating workers about their legal rights and 
protections.146 
Instead, advocacy groups, unions, worker centers, and government agencies 
should distribute materials, hang posters, give presentations, perform skits, and 
make announcements in the places where workers are otherwise accustomed to 
receiving information: at places of worship, at community centers, at festivals and 
fairs, on the radio, and on television. These outreach efforts could specifically 
                                                                                                                 
reported in earlier analyses does not, in fact, occur when the minimum wage is increased.”). 
 145. See Poster Page: Workplace Poster Requirements for Small Businesses and Other 
Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/boc/osdbu/sbrefa/poster
/matrix.htm. States have also experimented with notice and posting requirements of various 
specificity. See, e.g., Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, Wage Theft Protection Act, 
CA.GOV (Apr. 2013), http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Governor_signs_Wage_Theft_Protection
_Act_of_2011.html (describing California’s notice template requiring specific information 
on rates of pay, pay schedules, workers’ compensation, and overtime); Notice of Pay Rate, 
N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards
/employer/wage-theft-prevention-act.shtm (describing the notice requirements of New 
York’s Wage Theft Prevention Act, which requires disclosure of detailed pay information in 
English and in the worker’s native language; making notices available in Spanish, Chinese, 
Haitian Creole, Korean, Polish, or Russian). 
 146. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information, supra note 109, at 110 
(“[R]espondents overwhelmingly misunderstand the background legal rules governing the 
employment relationship. More specifically, they consistently overestimate the degree of job 
protection afforded by law, believing that employees have far greater rights not to be fired 
without good cause than they in fact have.” (emphasis omitted)); Kim, Norms, Learning, and 
Law, supra note 109, at 447 (“Contrary to the assumption commonly made by defenders of 
the at-will rule, [surveys of workers in Missouri, New York, and California] indicate that 
workers do not understand the default presumption [of at-will employment], but erroneously 
believe that the law affords them protection akin to a just cause contract, when, in fact, they 
can be dismissed at will.”); see also Gleeson, supra note 94, at 562 (“[I]t is clear that 
immigrant workers, like the average low-wage worker, often lack sufficient knowledge 
about the laws governing work in America. Language barriers and lack of culturally 
appropriate information intensify this barrier.”). 
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target the groups of workers shown by our analysis to be less likely to have 
accurate substantive and procedural legal knowledge: undocumented workers, 
those employed by relatively small or low-road employers, and women workers. 
The U.S. Department of Labor’s “We Can Help” initiative is an example of this 
sort of campaign, incorporating language-appropriate public service 
announcements and materials designed specifically to assure undocumented 
workers that they have substantive workplace rights and to educate them on 
enforcement procedures.147 Perhaps in this way accurate substantive and procedural 
legal knowledge will find its way into the web of information that workers carry 
with them into the workplace and that influences their ability and willingness to 
make claims on the job. 
Because lawyers themselves can also be sources of information about the law, 
access to legal advice and representation may be a key component to increasing 
workers’ legal knowledge. Though the phenomenon of lawyers ginning up cases by 
recruiting potential plaintiffs is often portrayed negatively by the media and 
academic commentators, little attention is paid to the potentially salutary function 
of so-called ambulance chasers and bounty hunters.148 Lawyers who take an active 
role in outreach efforts, whether to recruit clients or merely to perform a public 
service, serve a valuable education and empowerment function. Increasing access 
to legal services may then help address the legal knowledge deficit suggested by 
the data analyzed in this Article. (Though the survey data do not answer the 
question of whether lawyers were available to the respondents, lawyer usage was 
likely very low, as only 4% of workers chose to take their claims to any third party 
or intermediary outside the company.)149 
However, legal knowledge alone, even when paired with attorney access, is not 
enough to set the wheels of bottom-up workplace law enforcement into motion and 
send claims up the dispute resolution pyramid. Even the most informed worker may 
still choose not to make a claim, because the costs of claiming outweigh the 
benefits. A brief story, recounted in a Human Rights Watch report, illustrates this 
point.150 In 1999, 500 men came to North Carolina from Mexico with temporary, 
H-2A “guestworker” visas to work as farm laborers. Before they arrived, staff from 
a legal services organization had given them information booklets written in 
Spanish that described the U.S. laws that governed their wages and working 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. See Wage & Hour Div., supra note 91. 
 148. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency 
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006) 
(describing and countering criticisms of plaintiffs’ class action lawyers). 
 149. Study after study has documented the gulf between civil legal needs and lawyer 
availability, particularly for ex ante legal advice. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of 
Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the Corporate Practice of Law 1 (Ctr. in Law, 
Econ. & Org., Research Papers Series No. C12-16, 2012) (gathering studies and noting that 
“ordinary people are largely shut out from legal assistance; the great majority of legal work 
is done for corporations, organizations and governments”). 
 150. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 218–25 (2000), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/uslbr008.pdf. 
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conditions and explained the process of obtaining free legal services if their rights 
were violated. 
When the workers arrived in North Carolina, they attended an orientation 
session. Their employer warned them that the legal services organization was their 
enemy, to be avoided.151 He then told them to throw away their booklets and 
distributed an employee handbook, which warned: 
FLS [Farmworker Legal Services] has a hidden motive when they 
approach you. They say that they are your friends and they are 
concerned about your rights and well being [sic], but in reality their 
motive is to destroy the program which brings you to North Carolina 
legally . . . FLS discourage [sic] the growers with excessive suits which 
are for the most part without merit. The history of FLS shows that the 
workers who have talked with them have harmed themselves. Don’t be 
fooled and allow them to take away your jobs.152 
On the wall at the orientation site also hung a banner which read, in Spanish, 
“Legal Services Want to Destroy the H-2A Program” and “Don’t be a puppet of 
Legal Services.”153 Workers reported feeling that “if they keep [the] booklets or if 
they are ever seen with one of [the] booklets, they will be fired or have serious 
problems” with their employer.154 
In the eyes of worker advocates, the story of the legal services booklet describes 
a nearly perfectly-executed “know-your-rights” campaign.155 Workers received 
language-appropriate materials that fully explained their substantive and procedural 
legal rights. They even knew whom to call to get free legal representation if they 
ran into a problem. Yet even full substantive and procedural legal knowledge was 
likely neutralized by employer threats. Though we do not know from the report, it 
would be surprising if any of the North Carolina H-2A workers actually made 
claims about workplace problems that harvest season. Instead, in Hirschman’s 
construction, they likely chose exit or silent loyalty over voice. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. Id. at 218 (“[The workers’ employer] spoke at length about the Farmworker Unit of 
Legal Services of North Carolina . . . He told the workers that Legal Services was their 
‘enemy.’ He told the workers they should avoid Legal Services.”). 
 152. Id. at 218–19 (“‘Mr. Hill then held up a copy of the ‘Know Your Rights’ booklet 
produced by Legal Services. He ordered workers to toss the ‘Know Your Rights’ booklet 
into the trash can. . . .’ Following Hill’s admonition, workers discarded their booklets en 
masse.” (emphasis in original)). 
 153. Id. at 221. 
 154. Id. at 220. 
 155. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, A. Rachel Camp, Margaret E. Johnson, Catherine 
F. Klein & Lisa V. Martin, Teaching Social Justice Lawyering: Systematically Including 
Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 401, 404 (2012) 
(characterizing effective community legal education, including know-your-rights campaigns, 
as that which “‘encourag[es] planning on the basis of legal rights and obligations’; 
‘mobiliz[es] individuals and groups to pursue their rights’; ‘facilitat[es] and strengthen[s] 
community organizations’; ‘foster[s] self-help activities for which lawyers will not be 
necessary’; and ‘demystif[ies] the law’”). 
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B. Minimizing the Costs 
How, then, can workers be convinced to make claims? Part III has illustrated 
that roughly 48% of workers in the Unregulated Work Survey who had identified 
workplace problems chose not to make claims; Part IV has detailed the failure of 
the current system of operational rights to maximize workers’ benefits and 
minimize the costs of claiming. We suggest the following strategies to further 
minimize the risks faced by would-be bottom-up workplace law enforcers. 
First, Congress and the courts should strengthen existing retaliation protections 
within labor and employment laws by broadening the definition of “adverse 
employment action” to unambiguously include threats.156 This would acknowledge 
the chilling effect that such threats, even if never executed, have on workplace 
claiming behavior. It would also likely address the prevalence of non-actionable 
reprisals in the workplace, as illustrated by the 28% of workers in this analysis who 
made claims about justiciable workplace problems and then faced forms of 
retaliation that fell outside the coverage of labor and employment law. 
However, it is important to note that even legal regimes with extremely robust 
anti-retaliation provisions can fail to protect claimants and encourage claiming 
behavior. For example, Richard Moberly has reviewed the success of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility 
Act, which concerns corporate accounting standards and is considered the “gold 
standard” among retaliation protections in encouraging whistleblower claims.157 He 
reports that “the percentage of employee tips actually decreased after 
Sarbanes-Oxley” and that “the Act often failed to protect [whistleblowers] from 
reprisals and failed to compensate them consistently for the retaliation they 
suffered.”158 
To make it harder for employers to identify the workers to retaliate against, then, 
our second proposal is that Congress should eliminate the opt-in requirement of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. Particularly for low-wage, front-line workers, the opt-in 
requirement acts as a barrier to participation in litigation because it requires 
workers to take the very public step of joining a lawsuit, rather than being part of 
an anonymous class represented by a few named plaintiffs.159 Anonymous class 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and the Silencing of the 
Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779 (2013) (arguing that courts should recognize 
a cause of action for “per se” or “facial” violations of statutory anti-retaliation provisions to 
cover threats by employers designed to silence workers’ future potential protected activity). 
See generally Levinson, supra note 84; Clemons, supra note 84. 
 157. Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility (Sarbanes-
Oxley) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012); Estlund, supra note 6, at 376 (“Sarbanes-Oxley 
represents the gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers, with both criminal 
sanctions and fully compensatory private civil remedies against reprisals.”). 
 158. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 
S.C. L. REV. 1, 27−29 (2012) (emphasis in original) (noting that only 1.8% of employees 
who made claims of retaliation won their case before an administrative body, and no 
employee won for three straight years). 
 159. Alexander, supra note 135, at 484 (“In many ways, the opt in requirement of the 
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membership protects workers from retaliation, because employers may not be able 
to identify with certainty which particular workers are participating in a lawsuit. 
Moreover, workers have some measure of deniability, because they are included in 
the plaintiff class not because they chose to join, but rather because they fall into 
the class definition. Of course, this feature of the opt-out class action available 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 has been criticized for being 
undemocratic and discouraging plaintiff autonomy.160 However, this criticism fails 
to recognize the benefits of the anonymous, automatic nature of the traditional class 
action for low-wage, front-line plaintiffs who are extremely susceptible to 
retaliation.161 Thus, all areas of employment law should be made consistent with the 
great majority of federal statutes, in which plaintiffs are permitted to use the class 
action device of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and receive the protection of 
relative anonymity within the class.162 
Third, we propose an alternative method of claim resolution. For justiciable 
workplace claims that are not already covered by an administrative exhaustion 
requirement, the U.S. Department of Labor should establish an optional, one-way 
binding arbitration system, modeled on a program in place at The Coca-Cola 
Company, that would give workers a forum for speedy claim resolution.163 This 
                                                                                                                 
FLSA seems to eliminate any possibility of collective action, making the FLSA enforceable 
only by individuals or very small groups. The opt in requirement may, therefore, undermine 
the project of law enforcement generally, dissuading plaintiffs from acting collectively as 
private attorneys general to enforce the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime mandates.”). 
At the very least, courts should permit language in the opt-in notice that advises 
undocumented workers that their immigration status is not relevant to the case. See, e.g., 
Enriquez v. Cherry Hill Market Corp., Case No. 10-CV-5616-FB-MDG, (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 
2012), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyedce
/1:2010cv05616/312066/36/0.pdf?ts=1328966650 (order approving FLSA opt-in notice 
language informing potential opt-in plaintiffs that their immigration status is irrelevant). 
 160. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 135, at 484–86 (summarizing criticisms of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23 class actions). 
 161. Research is being conducted on the benefits of anonymity in the analogous 
whistleblower context and one study has found that “anonymity, trust, and risk are highly 
salient in the [whistle-blowing reporting system] context.” Paul Benjamin Lowry, Gregory 
D. Moody, Dennis F. Galletta & Anthony Vance, The Drivers in the Use of Online 
Whistle-Blowing Reporting Systems, 30 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 153, 154 (2013); see also Weil, 
supra note 23, at 13 (noting “over two decades of evidence that shows that workers are more 
likely to exercise rights given the presence of a collective workplace actor”). 
 162. We acknowledge that class members’ identities are often exposed at the end of a 
lawsuit when they must collect their portion of settlement or judgment proceeds. However, 
the risk of retaliation at this point is relatively low, as the litigation has already concluded. 
We also acknowledge that courts have restricted the Rule 23 class action as a vehicle for 
collective complaint, but we nevertheless think it preferable to the current opt-in regime in 
place in the Fair Labor Standards Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. 
 163. Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”? How Coke’s One-Way Binding 
Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 
77, 78 (2009) (“This unilateral arrangement—voluntarily adopted by the Coca-Cola 
Company following its historic employment discrimination class action settlement—is a 
groundbreaking and novel approach to promoting arbitration, while also protecting employee 
choice and access to the court system. One-way binding arbitration also offers employers an 
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system would not increase the size or certainty of the benefits of claiming, but 
would reduce the costs associated with trying to achieve those benefits. The 
program could be funded by civil monetary penalties collected by the Department 
from law-breaking employers, and arbitration would be free for workers who could 
demonstrate financial need, much as in forma pauperis determinations are made. 
The parties could choose to use this system at their discretion, and, as in Coca-
Cola’s system, the arbitrator’s decision would be binding on the employer only.164 
Particularly for workers who have been fired in retaliation for claims making, this 
system would allow them to collect back pay and/or return to their jobs more 
quickly than in a typical lawsuit, without requiring them to relinquish their right to 
file their claim in court. Employers, too, would benefit from the speed and 
efficiency of arbitration.165 (Employees with group claims, however, would still 
have to pursue their claims in court, as arbitration would not be well-suited for 
resolutions of collective or class actions.166) 
Each of these proposals seeks to lower the costs of claims making by increasing 
retaliation protections, facilitating group action by plaintiffs, and speeding up the 
process of workplace dispute resolution. However, as Steven Willborn has 
observed, minimizing worker costs may not be effective in and of itself in 
encouraging claims; increasing the benefits may also be necessary.167 
C. Maximizing the Benefits 
Workers might also be incentivized to act if there were greater benefits 
associated with making claims. Here, Congress could lift the cap on Title VII 
                                                                                                                 
opportunity to forge new ground. Companies can enjoy all of the benefits of arbitration—
such as efficiency, privacy, cost savings and litigation avoidance—while bolstering 
workplace relations that may enhance profitability.”); see also David Sherwyn, J. Bruce 
Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: 
Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999) (arguing that employees should reconsider arbitration as a 
tool for speedy resolution of disputes). 
 164. Malveaux, supra note 163, at 78−79 (describing Coca-Cola’s “one-way binding 
arbitration” program). 
 165. Id. at 119–20 (describing benefits to employers of one-way binding arbitration 
system including speed, efficiency, improved employee perception, and advantage in future 
litigation). 
 166. Id. at 134–35 (“Finally, while [Coca-Cola’s] Solutions program may be appropriate 
for addressing individual employee work-related matters, it is not appropriate for resolving 
class actions or other actions alleging systemic corporate misbehavior. Because of the 
important role the courts play in resolving cases with larger societal implications, employees 
must be permitted to challenge an employer’s pattern or practice of conduct without having 
to go through an internal company resolution process. The judiciary’s unique public function 
and procedural attributes make it especially well-suited for addressing large-scale 
employment issues.”) (emphasis in original). 
 167. Willborn, supra note 10, at 12–13 (“[E]ven with retaliation protection, individuals 
are more likely to come forward in situations in which there is little risk of retaliation than in 
situations where they have to rely on retaliation protections. In turn, this implies that positive 
inducements, rather than protection against negative consequences, may be necessary to 
produce adequate private enforcement in some circumstances.”). 
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damages,168 make punitive damages more readily available to plaintiffs, especially 
in cases of retaliation,169 and allow plaintiffs to collect treble damages, perhaps 
upon a showing of outrageous conduct and/or recidivism by the defendant.170 
Federal statutes in areas other than labor and employment provide models for 
offering increased incentives to expose wrongdoing. For example, the Internal 
Revenue Service entices people to report tax fraud by offering between 15% and 
30% of the back taxes and other funds ultimately collected by the Service;171 the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act offers 
whistleblowers between 10% and 30% of monies recovered as a result of tips about 
insider trading and other violations of securities law;172 the qui tam provision of the 
False Claims Act allows people who report fraud against the federal government to 
collect up to 30% of recovered damages.173 
However, in practice, such incentives may not be very effective at encouraging 
claims making. A study of federal statutory whistleblower incentives reveals that, 
“although [individual] rewards under existing whistleblower programs may be 
substantial, general use of the programs is not high.”174 This, again, points to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006) (imposing caps on Title VII damages of between 
$50,000 and $300,000 depending on employer size). 
 169. At present, punitive damages are generally not available for retaliation claims under 
the FLSA, the National Labor Relations Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and are available, but with statutory caps, under Title VII. 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (“A complaining party [under Title VII] may recover punitive damages 
under this section against a respondent . . . if the complaining party demonstrates that the 
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with 
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (capping Title VII damages at between $50,000 and $300,000 depending 
on employer size); Jackson v. Estelle’s Place, LLC, 391 Fed. Appx. 239, 247 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that punitive damages “are not available for claims under the FLSA”); Alvarado v. 
Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1265, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting courts’ “divergent 
approaches” to availability of punitive damages for ADA retaliation claims and holding that 
punitive damages are not available); Farrell v. Tri-Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist., 530 F.3d 1023, 
1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well-settled that the FMLA, by its terms, ‘only provides for 
compensatory damages and not punitive damages.’” (quoting Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 
1125, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003))); NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Fayetteville, Inc., 258 
F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that “an explicitly punitive method of calculation [of 
backpay] is contrary to the purposes of the [National Labor Relations] Act”). 
 170. The Fair Labor Standards Act already allows plaintiffs to collect double or liquidated 
damages. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2006). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act both allow collection of treble damages. Trusts in Restraint of Trade 
Illegal, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1961 (2006). 
 171. Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah Webber, Paying the IRS Whistleblower: A Critical 
Analysis of Collected Proceeds, 32 VA. TAX REV. 77, 86 (2012). 
 172. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1957 (2010). 
 173. Civil Actions for False Claims, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)–(d) (2006). 
 174. Jonathan L. Awner & Denise Dickins, Will There Be Whistleblowers?, 34 REG. 36, 39 
(2011). At the time of writing, the Dodd-Frank Act was still fairly new, and so the success of its 
whistleblower incentive provisions are still relatively untested. In addition, in 2012, an IRS 
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tricky problem of cost and benefit: if existing reward programs targeting 
sophisticated potential whistleblowers in the financial sector have been relatively 
unsuccessful in incentivizing claims,175 it is likely that the analog in the labor and 
employment law context—offering much higher damages awards as an increased 
potential benefit for plaintiffs—may also fail to encourage low-wage, front-line 
workers to exercise voice.176 
D. Increasing Government Enforcement 
Each of the foregoing reforms would preserve the fundamental bottom-up nature 
of workplace law enforcement, while attempting to improve workers’ legal 
knowledge and recalibrate their incentive structures such that low-wage, front-line 
workers might be enabled to act as enforcers of their workplace rights. However, 
given the fundamental problems with bottom-up enforcement suggested by the 
Unregulated Work Survey data, such tinkering around the margins might be 
insufficient, akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. 
A more fundamental reform would advocate shifting more enforcement from the 
bottom to the top, increasing government investigation and oversight rather than 
relying so heavily on workers themselves to be the drivers of enforcement activity. 
After all, government enforcement agents are insulated from many of the risks 
faced by worker-claimants: their salaries are paid regardless of the outcome of a 
lawsuit, and they are unaffected by defendant retaliation.177 
Michael Waterstone has made just such a proposal in the disability law context. 
He argues that certain case types—failure to hire and public accessibility—are 
particularly well suited to public enforcement.178 In the labor and employment 
context, Steven Willborn has suggested case types that would be appropriate for 
increased government enforcement, in areas where private litigation leaves gaps: 
“low-damages cases, large cases which involve heavy litigation-related 
investments, and violations not producing wage losses.”179 Likewise, David Weil 
has advocated that the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division focus 
its investigative resources on “fissured” industries, in which businesses employ 
                                                                                                                 
tipster received an unprecedented award of $104 million. Paul Sullivan, The Price 
Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2012, at B1. It remains to be seen 
whether this highly-publicized award will increase the level of IRS whistleblower activity. 
 175. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 174 (describing the costs that whistleblowers pay, “If 
you look at the field of whistle-blowers, you see a high degree of bankruptcies. You may 
find yourself unemployable. Home foreclosures, divorce, suicide and depression all go with 
this territory.”). 
 176. In addition, research has shown that, among the options of rewards, liabilities, 
duties, and protections, the availability of rewards for reporting illegal conduct may trigger 
“less reporting than merely offering protection or establishing a duty.” Feldman & Lobel, 
supra note 21, at 1155. 
 177. See Yaniv, supra note 5, at 352 (“While the expected gain from complaining is 
obvious, there is a serious risk involved: losing one’s job. However, when a worker’s 
complaint is placed anonymously (or when the enforcement agency is bound not to disclose 
his identity), there is no reason to expect a personal reaction on the part of his employer.”). 
 178. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 
437 (2007). 
 179. Willborn, supra note 10, at 13. 
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high numbers of subcontractors and other contingent workers and disclaim any 
legal responsibility for wages and working conditions.180 
To these lists we add cases in which workers would be particularly unlikely to 
complain on their own, where workers have low levels of substantive and 
procedural legal knowledge, and where workers are highly susceptible to 
retaliation. Indeed, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s most 
recent Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) names as an enforcement priority 
“[p]rotecting [i]mmigrant, [m]igrant, and [o]ther [v]ulnerable [w]orkers,” and calls 
for a focus on “[i]ssues affecting workers who may lack an awareness of their legal 
protections, or who may be reluctant or unable to exercise their rights.”181 
In implementing goals such as these, government enforcers could develop a sort 
of “vulnerability index,” taking into account workers’ wages, immigration status, 
unionization levels, and education levels within a particular industry.182 Industries 
with high vulnerability index scores could be prioritized in agencies’ strategic 
enforcement plans.183 Likewise, agencies might prioritize retaliation cases and send 
a message to unscrupulous employers that they will not be permitted to silence 
worker claims through threatened and actual reprisals. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. WEIL, supra note 3, at 18–26. 
 181. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN: FY 
2013–2016, 1, 8 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm. The EEOC has 
also explored using the commissioner’s charge mechanism strategically, considering “factors 
such as current economic conditions, demographic data, relevant labor markets, industry 
data, underserved areas or populations and charge data.” LESLIE E. SILVERMAN ET AL., 
SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT: TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION 15 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/systemic.cfm. 
 182. Martha Albertson Fineman’s extensive work on vulnerability provides a theoretical 
backdrop for creation of a vulnerability index; Kerry Rittich’s work on employee 
vulnerability is informative as well. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable 
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 20–21 
(2008) (“The vulnerability inquiry examines the ways in which societal resources are 
channeled to see if the result is to privilege and protect some while tolerating the 
disadvantage and vulnerability of others. This focus on the structuring of societal institutions 
reflects the fact that the state has an affirmative obligation not to privilege any group of 
citizens over others and to actively structure conditions for equality.”); KERRY RITTICH, LAW 
COMM’N OF CAN., VULNERABILITY AT WORK: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE NEW 
ECONOMY 3 (2004) (“Vulnerability and insecurity at work can arise from: 1) the distribution 
of risks, costs, benefits and powers among workers and employers; 2) the (in)capacity of 
workers to conform to or perform according to workplace rules and norms; 3) the allocation 
of work among workers, including unpaid work; 4) (in)access to resources; 5) 
discrimination, either directly on the basis of a particular characteristics or grounds or 
through their intersectional operation or indirectly, because of the connection between these 
grounds and the factors listed above.”). 
 183. The U.S. Department of Labor’s public communications speak of advocacy on 
behalf of “vulnerable workers” such as homeless people, but do not appear to define that 
term. See, e.g., Vulnerable Workers, U.S DEP’T LAB. NEWS BRIEF, Oct. 18, 2012, available 
at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/newsletter/2012/20121018.pdf (reporting on “roundtable 
discussions” between U.S. Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and “representatives of vulnerable 
communities in Seattle, New Orleans and San Francisco”). 
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However, as Cynthia Estlund has observed, it may not be realistic to expect 
“regulators’ sights . . . to remain permanently fixed on the targeted sectors,” as 
there will “simply never be enough government inspectors to do the job alone.”184 
Nor would a completely top-down labor and employment inspectorate-type system 
be desirable, as it would throw the benefits of bottom-up enforcement out with the 
proverbial bathwater.185 Public and private workplace law enforcement should exist 
in a complementary relationship, in which one mode of enforcement compensates 
for the failings and inadequacies of the other. We have argued here that the current 
system of bottom-up workplace law enforcement relies too heavily on workers 
themselves to be claims-makers. A reinvigorated, targeted, top-down enforcement 
regime, along with reforms to the bottom-up system to expand workers’ legal 
knowledge and offer better incentives for claims making, would draw on the 
strengths of both modes of enforcement and, we hope, ultimately improve 
conditions for low-wage, front-line workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Estlund, supra note 6, at 362, 403. 
 185. See supra Introduction (outlining bottom-up enforcement’s theoretical benefits); see 
also Kevin Kolben, The WTO Distraction, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 483 (2010) 
(describing problems in countries with top-down labor inspectorate systems of “weak 
enforcement and poor compliance by the regulated, [and] almost negligible, understaffed, 
and corrupt labor inspectorates”). 
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APPENDIX A: UNREGULATED WORK SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Survey Questions Related to Workplace Problems and Claims 
1. During the last 12 months, did you make a complaint, either by yourself or 
with co-workers, about your working conditions, by going to your 
employer, supervisor or going to a government agency? Don’t tell me yet 
about any attempts you may have made to form a labor union, we’ll get to 
that later. 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
2. How many times did you make a complaint, either alone or with your 
co-workers, over the past 12 months? Remember, I’m talking about 
complaints that you made about a job here in CITY. 
 
a. None, never made complaint 
b. 1–96 times 
c. More than 96 times (SPECIFY) 
 
3. Tell me about the most recent complaint you made. What specifically did 
you complain about? Choose all that apply. 
 
a. Paid below the minimum wage  
b. Not paid for all hours worked 
c. Forced to work off the clock  
d. Not paid for overtime 
e. Not paid on time  
f. Improper deductions from paycheck  
g. Dangerous working conditions  
h. Discrimination  
i. Abuse or harassment by supervisor  
j. Abuse or harassment by co-worker 
k. No breaks, or not enough breaks 
l. Bad schedule/shift 
m. Needed a raise/pay is too low 
n. Lack of health insurance or paid sick days 
o. Increased workloads—made me/us work more  
p. Other (SPECIFY) 
  
4. Did you make this complaint by yourself, or with your co-workers? 
 
a. Myself 
b. With co-workers 
c. Both186 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. We coded “both” responses as claims made with co-workers rather than alone. 
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5. When did you make this most recent complaint?  
 
a. ENTER YEAR (2006–2008):  
b. ENTER MONTH (1–12):  
 
6. How did you make this complaint? Choose all that apply. 
 
a. Discussed the problem with supervisor or employer.  
b. Asked a lawyer, union representative, worker center, or other 
community group to complain to employer on your behalf.  
c. Filed a complaint with an agency, like the Department of Labor 
or OSHA 
d. Testified at a hearing/participated in an official investigation into 
a claim 
e. Other (SPECIFY)  
 
7. During the past 12 months, were there times when you DID NOT 
complain, even though you had a problem at your job with dangerous 
working conditions, discrimination, not being paid the minimum wage or 
not being paid overtime? Again, I’m only talking about jobs you’ve held 
here in CITY. 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
8. What stopped you from complaining? Choose all that apply. 
 
a. Afraid of losing your job 
b. Afraid to say anything because of immigration status 
c. Afraid of getting hours or wages cut  
d. Afraid the company would close down  
e. Seen other co-workers disciplined (fired, threatened or treated 
badly) for speaking up  
f. Did not know who to talk to or where to take the complaint 
g. Employer made threats to you or your coworkers—if you filed a 
complaint they would fire you, report you to immigration, etc 
h. Didn’t think it would make a difference (tried in the past but 
didn’t get anywhere) 
i. Other (SPECIFY) 
Survey Questions Related to Retaliation 
Note: At this point in the survey, the respondent is being asked to focus on his or 
her most recent complaint made within the past twelve months. 
 
1. Did your employer or supervisor know you made this complaint? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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2. Did your employer or supervisor do any of the following as a direct result 
of this complaint? Choose all that apply. 
 
a. Did your employer or supervisor threaten to fire you or your 
co-workers? 
b. Did they threaten to call the police or immigration? 
c. (Did they) threaten to close or move the company? 
d. (Did they) fire you or your co-workers? 
e. (Did they) suspend you or your co-workers? 
 
3. How about any of these? (Did your employer or supervisor do any of the 
following as a direct result of this complaint?) Choose all that apply. 
 
a. (Did they) cut your or your co-workers’ hours, or change your 
schedules? 
b. (Did they) cut your or your co-workers’ pay? 
c. (Did they) give you or your co-workers worse work assignments? 
d. (Did they) harass or abuse you or your co-workers? 
e. Did your employer ignore you & did nothing? 
f. Did your employer do anything else that I haven’t mentioned? 
(SPECIFY) 
Survey Questions Related to Substantive and Procedural Legal Knowledge 
1. Do you know where to file a complaint with the government if you are 
having a problem with an employer? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
2. As far as you know, what is the current minimum wage in CITY?  
 
a. ENTER AMOUNT 
 
3. As far as you know, do employers have to pay workers more than their 
usual wage when they work more than 40 hours in a week? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
4. As far as you know, does the law allow employers to pay undocumented 
workers less than the minimum wage? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
Survey Questions Related to Social Networks 
1. First, I want you to think about ALL the people that you know 
PERSONALLY. That means your family, your relatives and your friends, 
but ALSO co-workers and people you know who you have seen in the past 
SIX MONTHS. Don’t just tell me about people who you know really well, 
but also people you see often or speak with regularly, including people in 
your neighborhood. Now I’m going to read you a list of jobs, and ask you 
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how many people you know who do each type of job. They should be 
people who: 
 
a. ARE 18 YEARS OLD OR OLDER. 
b. ARE WORKING FOR SOMEONE ELSE: So if they own their 
own business, or if they manage or supervise other people, don’t 
count them. 
c. ARE CURRENTLY WORKING here in LOCATION. You can 
count people who are working off the books, and people who 
don’t have their immigration papers. Here’s a map of 
LOCATION. 
 
2. I’m going to read you a type of job, and for each, tell me how many 
people you know who are currently working that type of job: 
 
a. How about, security guards? 
b. Teacher’s aides? Please do not count teachers, just teacher’s 
aides. 
c. People who work in private homes as nannies, domestic workers, 
or housekeepers. Please don’t count teenagers or people who 
babysit once in a while. 
d. What about other child care workers, who either work in a day 
care center, or take children into their own homes? 
e. People who are housekeepers in hotels? 
f. People who work in restaurants, bars, fast food places, cafeterias, 
and other places where food or drinks are served. For example, 
cooks, dishwashers, cashiers, bus boys, and waiters and 
waitresses, and people who deliver food for restaurants. 
g. Janitors or cleaners in buildings, hotels, or stores. 
h. People who work in hair salons and nail salons. Please don’t 
count people who own their own businesses. 
i. People who work in residential construction, building or 
remodeling single family homes or small apartment buildings. 
This would include painters, laborers, drywall installers, and 
roofers. Please do not count subcontractors, managers or crew 
leaders, or skilled trades like electricians and plumbers. 
j. Gardeners and landscapers. Please do not count subcontractors, 
managers, or crew leaders. 
k. People who work in car washes or as gas station attendants. 
l. People who work as nursing aides in nursing homes 
m. What about home health care workers, who take care of patients 
in the patients’ homes? 
n. People who work for dry cleaners or laundries, including laundry 
plants. 
o. People who work in food manufacturing, like meatpacking, food 
processing and baking. Please count workers who operate 
machines, work on assembly lines, pack products into boxes, or 
move or ship those products. And please count people who work 
at home doing food preparation for a company or restaurant. 
p. People who work making clothes for companies. Please count 
workers who sew, cut fabric, pack clothing into boxes or onto 
hangers, and inspect finished products. And please count people 
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who work in factories and also those who work out of their home 
for a company. 
q. People who work in furniture factories. Please don’t count 
managers, just people who work on the shop floor. 
r. People who do packing and moving jobs in warehouses. 
s. People who work in grocery stores, drug stores, or supermarkets. 
For example, cashiers and baggers, people who wash and sort 
produce or who work in the stock room, as well as people who 
make deliveries. Please do not count managers, pharmacists, 
butchers or other specialty foodworkers, or people who work as 
janitors and cleaners. 
t. People who work in other kinds of retail stores, like department 
stores, clothing stores, office supply stores, furniture stores, or 
auto supply stores. Again, we are interested in people who work 
as cashiers, on the shop floor helping customers, who make 
deliveries, or who work in the stock room—but not janitors. And 
don’t count people who work in a car dealership. 
u. People who work as bank tellers. 
v. People who repair cars. For example, people who do body work, 
change tires, and make engine repairs, but who do not work for 
an auto dealership. 
w. People who work in parking garages, parking lots or as valet 
parkers. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 7. RDS Population Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals 
 
Variable 
 
 
Population 
point estimate  
 
Lower 
confidence 
interval 
 
Upper 
confidence 
interval 
 
 
Identified (perceived) 
workplace problem in past 
12 months 
 
 
33.10% 
 
 
30.71% 
 
 
35.49% 
 
Made claim about 
workplace problem in past 
 12 months 
 
 
56.87% 
 
 
50.79% 
 
 
62.95% 
 
Made claim about 
justiciable workplace 
problem in past 12 months 
 
 
65.12% 
 
 
57.95% 
 
 
72.28% 
 
Method(s) of claiming187    
 
To employer 95.87% 95.87% 95.87% 
 
To lawyer, union rep, or other 
Intermediary 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
To government agency — — — 
 
Subject(s) of claim    
 
Quality of worklife, e.g. 
commute time, 
workload, work 
schedule 
 
 
 
44.51% 
 
 
 
35.13% 
 
 
 
53.88% 
 
Pay 39.73% 32.35% 47.11% 
 
Discrimination, 
harassment, or abuse 
 
27.42% 
 
19.34% 
 
35.49% 
 
Unsafe working conditions — — — 
 
Benefits — — — 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. Because survey respondents were given the opportunity to choose more than one 
answer to the questions concerning method of claiming, subject of claim, and the reason why 
some respondents did not make a claim, those population point estimates refer to the 
percentage of responses, not the percentage of respondents. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
    
Variable 
 
 
Population 
point estimate  
 
Lower 
confidence 
interval 
 
Upper 
confidence 
interval 
 
 
Reason(s) for not making claim    
 
Afraid would be fired 59.77% 55.90% 63.65% 
 
Did not think claim would 
make a difference 
 
45.92% 
 
42.35% 
 
49.49% 
 
Some other/miscellaneous 
reason 
 
25.48% 
 
19.59% 
 
31.36% 
 
Saw others retaliated 
against for making claims 
 
14.28% 
 
9.02% 
 
19.53% 
 
Afraid of hours/wages being 
cut 
 
11.97% 
 
8.35% 
 
15.59% 
 
Did not know how to make a 
claim 
 
11.82% 
 
5.73% 
 
17.92% 
 
Afraid due to immigration 
status 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
Afraid due to employer threats — — — 
 
Afraid company would close — — — 
 
Employer response to most recent 
claim about justiciable 
problem in past 12 months 
   
 
Reprisals 43.05% 39.80% 46.29% 
 
Unlawful retaliation  34.73% 27.57% 41.89% 
 
Addressed/promised to address 
claim (resolution) 
 
14.92% 
 
9.64% 
 
20.19% 
 
Inaction/other response — — — 
 
Knows minimum wage and 
overtime rights (substantive 
legal knowledge) 
 
 
41.01% 
 
 
38.47% 
 
 
43.55% 
 
Knows where to file government 
complaint (procedural 
legal knowledge) 
 
 
 
22.23% 
 
 
20.05% 
 
 
24.41% 
 
Note: Because population point estimates are estimates, within upper and lower confidence 
intervals, not all sets of figures for a given variable will sum to 100%. In addition, some 
variables had too few observations within the data set for RDSAT to generate a population 
point estimate. These are indicated with a dash in the relevant field. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 8. Logistic Regression Results: Workplace Problems 
 
Independent variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
 
Robust 
standard error 
 
Statistical 
significance (p-
value) 
 
 
Female -.2064162** .0935926 0.027 
Black or African American -.1831411 .1394766 0.189 
Asian or other race -.0692085 .1399979 0.621 
White -.1969036 .209114 0.346 
Age (log) -.3902301*** .1420976 0.006 
Years of education (log)  .2263875*** .0826076 0.006 
No legal immigration status  .1579034 .1187964 0.184 
Does not know minimum wage 
and overtime rights 
(substantive legal knowledge) 
 
 
-.0122081 
 
 
.095769 
 
 
0.899 
Does not know where to file 
government complaint  
procedural legal knowledge) 
 
 
 .2377473** 
 
 
.1098959 
 
 
0.031 
Not a union member  -.2904993† .1879356 0.122 
Job tenure of fewer than 12 
months 
 
-.2210349* 
 
.1168781 
 
0.059 
Employer has fewer than 100 
employees 
 
-.322473*** 
 
.1033499 
 
0.002 
Employer is not “high road”   .4308615*** .1103767 0.000 
Constant 
 
 .5335444 
 
.6071023 
 
0.379 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable = Respondent identified workplace problem in 12 months 
before survey (0,1). 
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15  
 
Number of observations  3620   
Wald chi2(13)  59.60   
Prob > chi2  0.0000   
Pseudo R2  0.0216   
Log pseudolikelihood  
 
-2237.3288   
Base category (constant)  Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal immigration status; 
has substantive legal knowledge; has procedural legal 
knowledge; union member; job tenure of 12 or more 
months; employer has 100 or more employees; 
employer is “high road” 
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Table 9. Logistic Regression Results: Claims 
 
Independent variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
standard 
error 
 
Statistical 
significance 
(p-value) 
 
 
Female -0.0527787 0.1440536 0.714 
Black or African American -0.0707228 0.2309246 0.759 
Asian or other race -0.3814158† 0.2337536 0.103 
White  0.0757693 0.3396625 0.823 
Age (log) -0.3275930† 0.2170615 0.131 
Years of education (log)  0.1323876 0.1239154 0.285 
No legal immigration status -0.1132518 0.1902730 0.552 
Does not know minimum wage and 
overtime rights (substantive legal 
knowledge) 
 
 
-0.2655614* 
 
 
0.1484176 
 
 
0.074 
Does not know where to file government 
complaint (procedural legal 
knowledge) 
 
 
-0.3736151** 
 
 
0.1823592 
 
 
0.040 
Not a union member  -0.4599542† 0.3175203 0.147 
Job tenure of fewer than 12 months -0.5530929*** 0.1740706 0.001 
Employer has fewer than 100 employees -0.0815789 0.1637656 0.618 
Employer is not “high road”  -0.3828674* 0.1961185 0.051 
Constant  2.7929570 0.9305910 0.003 
 
Note: Dependent variable = Respondent made claim about workplace problem in 12 
months before survey (0,1). 
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15  
 
Number of observations  1422   
Wald chi2(13)  38.84   
Prob > chi2  0.0002   
Pseudo R2  0.0380   
Log pseudolikelihood  
 
-901.68482 
 
  
Base category (constant)  Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal 
immigration status; has substantive legal 
knowledge; has procedural legal knowledge; 
union member; job tenure of 12 or more 
months; employer has 100 or more 
employees; employer is “high road.” 
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Table 10. Logistic Regression Results: Retaliation 
 
Independent variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
standard 
error 
 
Statistical 
significance 
(p-value) 
 
 
Female -0.2982914 0.2634372 0.258 
Black or African American -0.5121672 0.3697562 0.166 
Asian or other race  0.2198756 0.4566514 0.630 
White -0.0897640 0.4907023 0.855 
Age (log)  0.4817006 0.3979467 0.226 
Years of education (log) -0.1829480 0.2287591 0.424 
No legal immigration status  0.4604266 0.3412907 0.177 
Not a union member  -0.7078947 0.5087682 0.164 
Job tenure of fewer than 12 months -0.1129911 0.3613206 0.754 
Employer has fewer than 100 employees -0.0887306 0.3109330 0.775 
Employer is not “high road”   0.4319436 0.3192539 0.176 
Made claim alone  -0.4446391* 0.2584028 0.085 
Constant  0.2221966 1.5574580 0.887 
 
Note: Dependent variable = Respondent experienced retaliation as a result of most recent 
claim about justiciable workplace problem within 12 months before survey (0,1). 
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15  
 
Number of observations  560   
Wald chi2(12)  17.55   
Prob > chi2  0.1301   
Pseudo R2  0.0430   
Log pseudolikelihood  
 
-313.31388 
 
  
Base category (constant)  Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal 
immigration status; union member; job tenure 
of 12 or more months; employer has 100 or 
more employees; employer is “high road”; 
made claim with other workers. 
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Table 11. Logistic Regression Results: Substantive Legal Knowledge 
 
Independent variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
standard 
error 
 
Statistical 
significance 
(p-value) 
 
 
Female  0.0120387 0.0929117 0.897 
Black or African American -0.5531989*** 0.1376899 0.000 
Asian or other race -0.2072459† 0.1411088 0.142 
White -0.8291724*** 0.2288281 0.000 
Age (log) -0.5192653*** 0.1412215 0.000 
Years of education (log) -0.0775112 0.0796029 0.330 
No legal immigration status  0.1742892† 0.1202510 0.147 
Does not know where to file government 
complaint (procedural legal 
knowledge) 
 
 
-0.0930504 
 
 
0.1068239 
 
 
0.384 
Not a union member   0.3069922* 0.1849017 0.097 
Job tenure of fewer than 12 months  0.0398983 0.1148611 0.728 
Employer has fewer than 100 employees -0.6794804*** 0.1029398 0.000 
Employer is not “high road”   0.1127068 0.1101022 0.306 
Constant  1.8517130 0.6169684 0.003 
 
Note: Dependent variable = Respondent knows minimum wage and overtime rights (0,1). 
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15  
 
Number of observations  3620   
Wald chi2(12)  96.42   
Prob > chi2  0.0000   
Pseudo R2  0.0356   
Log pseudolikelihood  
 
-2302.8753 
 
  
Base category (constant)  Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal immigration 
status; has procedural legal knowledge; union 
member; job tenure of 12 or more months; 
employer has 100 or more employees; 
employer is “high road.” 
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Table 12. Logistic Regression Results: Procedural Legal Knowledge 
 
Independent variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
standard 
error 
 
Statistical 
significance 
(p-value) 
 
 
Female -0.5572914*** 0.1060106 0.000 
Black or African American  0.3197659** 0.1425108 0.025 
Asian or other race -0.3812027** 0.1536963 0.013 
White  0.0593975 0.2199687 0.787 
Age (log)  0.7814716*** 0.1601408 0.000 
Years of education (log)  0.2641330** 0.1036941 0.011 
No legal immigration status -0.9870480*** 0.1465031 0.000 
Does not know minimum wage and 
overtime rights (substantive legal 
knowledge) 
 
 
-0.0816583 
 
 
0.1071086 
 
 
0.446 
Not a union member  -0.2234331 0.1967807 0.256 
Job tenure of fewer than 12 months -0.1341045 0.1382338 0.332 
Employer has fewer than 100 employees -0.1500885 0.1172208 0.200 
Employer is not “high road”  -0.3894764*** 0.1199624 0.001 
Constant -3.1797170 0.6946226 0.000 
 
Note: Dependent variable = Respondent knows where to file government complaint (0,1). 
 
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15  
 
Number of observations  3606   
Wald chi2(12)  198.28   
Prob > chi2  0.0000   
Pseudo R2  0.0921   
Log pseudolikelihood  
 
-1787.7217   
Base category (constant)  Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal immigration 
status; has substantive legal knowledge; union 
member; job tenure of 12 or more months; 
employer has 100 or more employees; 
employer is “high road.” 
 
  
